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FOREWORD
This important monograph focuses on the emergence of armed robotic systems on the early 21stcentury battlefield and the new strategic realities that
their fielding may entail. It utilizes a little known—yet
decades old—weapons systems life cycle analytical
approach, to place these warfighting technologies in
a larger strategic context. This is provided by means
of case studies focusing on the developmental progression of the knight from the 9th through the 16th
century, the battleship from the 19th through the 20th
century, and the tank from the 20th into the 21st century. This progression follows experimental, institutionalized, ritualized, and satirized life cycle phases in
which a weapons system is first worked out for battlefield deployment, is then optimized as it matures, later
becomes increasingly obsolete as it passes its prime,
and finally is suicidal to use as advanced warfighting technologies move beyond it. For the three case
studies utilized in this work, these phases are fully
discussed and analyzed. Armed robotic systems emergence is then focused upon and analyzed from the
perspective of those systems in the early experimental
life cycle phase. The new strategic realities related to
armed robotic systems emergence are then provided
in a query and response format. Finally, a number of
short recommendations are provided to begin to help
us focus on the coming robotic revolution in warfare.
Of specific interest to Army and related Department
of Defense (DoD) professionals, as well as U.S. policymakers and scholars, may be the interplay of what
the author calls the present ritualization of the tank
(as a legacy weapons system) with the experimental
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activities surrounding armed robotic systems (as an
ascendant weapons system).
This monograph is representative of a growing
number of works that are being produced by Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) scholars—in the U.S. Army
War College (USAWC) Press and in other professional
and academic venues—on the subject of armed robotic
systems. It is projected that these systems will have an
immense impact on the future conduct of land warfare. Indicators of their revolutionary and disruptive
capabilities can already be witnessed with the initial
establishment and buildup of the U.S. armed drone
program centered on Predators, and later Reapers,
since late 2001. Armed robotic systems will not only
be utilized by the U.S. Army and its sister services;
but also by allied militaries, as well as our opponents,
including belligerent state and even nonstate entities,
in battlefield environments as well as insurgencies,
and by means of terrorist acts.
With these thoughts in mind, it is foreseen that
the reader will find this unique monograph a worthy
addition to the ongoing SSI scholarship in this topical
area. While its concluding section may raise more new
questions than it answers, a key component related to
our maturing understanding of the new strategic realities armed robotic systems may pose is to gain greater
knowledge of the broader military historical context
within which these advanced weapons systems are
emerging. Once such knowledge is gained, the Army
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and the other services need to act upon it in order to
create the force structure and doctrine required to
field armed droids and drones for continued U.S. warfighting dominance.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The fielding of armed robotic systems—droids and
drones that are teleoperated, semi-autonomous, and
even autonomous—has been slowly but surely transitioning from pure science fiction into military reality on the battlefields of the early 21st century. These
systems currently have no artificial intelligence (AI)
whatsoever and, in most cases, are simply operated
by soldiers (and on occasion terrorists and insurgents)
utilizing hardline cables and laptop-like controllers,
although wireless and satellite systems exist for the
more sophisticated national armed drone programs.
Near-term future prototypes are likely to have, at best,
independent response capabilities similar to a trained
animal, due to the incorporation of expert system programming. Projections out even further, however, have
raised concerns that these emergent weapons systems,
possessing semi-autonomous and autonomous capabilities, could ultimately have the potential to evolve
beyond the machine stimulus and response level,
eventually incorporating varying degrees of weak AI,
and one day possibly even achieving a basic form of
self-awareness.
This monograph will initially discuss the weapons
systems life cycles analytical approach, which is militarily historical and qualitative in its methodology.
This approach distinguishes between the experimental
(entrepreneurial), institutionalized, ritualized, and satirized (or romanticized) phases that exist for an individual weapons system. It will then draw upon three
case studies related to the knight, the battleship, and
the tank in order to explain this militarily historical
process and provide the needed context in which to
strategically understand the expected trajectory that
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armed robotic systems may begin to progress through,
if earlier weapons systems developmental patterns
hold true. Given the U.S. Army’s great reliance on
armored forces in the modern era, special attention
has been afforded to the tank. Not only is this weapons
system undergoing its own process of life cycle phase
progression into what can be argued is its ritualized
phase, but it is also projected that, at some point in
the future, armed robotic systems will be co-fielded in
coordination with tank forces.
Derived from the analysis conducted in this monograph, armed robotic systems can be readily recognized
as still being in their initial experimental (entrepreneurial) life cycle phase. Modern militaries—with the
United States in the lead—have been engaging in a trial
and error process of developing and fielding these systems for about 15 years. This entire process is a result
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initially placing air-to-ground missiles (AGM) on a Predator drone
in 2001. This event was prompted by a mission in
October 2001, directed at Mullah Mohammed Omar—
the Taliban leader—as part of the global U.S. response
to the 9/11 attacks carried out by al-Qaeda. Predator
drones have existed since 1995, when they were first
deployed to Bosnia. Until the attempted targeted-killing of Mullah Omar, however, they had only been utilized for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) missions.
Drawing upon this monograph’s analysis, the
emergence of armed robotic systems and the strategic
questions pertaining to them can be better placed in
historical context, that is, as they relate to military technical advances, identifiable weapons systems life cycle
developmental patterns, and their interactions with
changes in warfare over time. The following questions
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of immediate warfighting importance—given the new
strategic realities that armed robotic systems likely
portend—and the analytical responses to them are
provided in this manuscript:
• What threat and/or technological advancements are armed robotic systems being fielded
to contend with?
• What present weapons systems may armed
robotic systems make obsolete?
• How are armed robotic systems more technologically advanced (and have more energy potential at their disposal) than the legacy weapons
systems they may be eventually replacing?
• How do we know when we have achieved the
armed robotic systems’ institutionalized life
cycle phase?
• How many years will the armed robotic systems’ experimental life cycle phase span?
• What are the implications of the ritualized life
cycle phase of the tank on the experimental
fielding of armed robotic systems?
• What are the implications of fielding armed
robotic systems—and for that matter, industrial
robots—vis-à-vis the integrity of the American
middle class?
• What are the implications of armed robotic
systems proliferation—especially semi-autonomous and autonomous systems—on the human
species?
A number of initial recommendations have been
generated for U.S. Army and Joint force personnel
pertaining to the emergence of armed robotic systems
on the battlefield. These recommendations are not
meant to be authoritative but rather, given the present
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experimental nature of armed robotic systems as their
initial prototypes and fielding is being worked out, to
be simply taken as educated guidance. These recommendations pertain to the following thematic areas:
• Leadership Education;
• Strategy Development;
• Intelligence; and,
• Research and Wargaming.
In summation, the strategic implications of the
robotics revolution upon us cannot be overstated. The
robots are not only coming—they are here—and for
future U.S. national security requirements, we will
need to have a military mastery over them. Hence,
our present and future decisions related to armed
robotic systems emergence on the battlefield—and the
command and control (C2) methodologies directing
them—will result in near-term and future force structure end states that will have a fundamental impact on
the U.S. conduct of war in the coming decades. These
decisions will be a major determinant concerning the
ability of the United States to retain dominance as the
primary global military power well into the mid-21st
century.
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ARMED ROBOTIC SYSTEMS EMERGENCE:
WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIFE CYCLES ANALYSIS
AND NEW STRATEGIC REALITIES
The fielding of armed robotic systems—droids and
drones that are teleoperated, semi-autonomous, and
even autonomous—has been slowly but surely transitioning from pure science fiction into military reality on the battlefields of the early 21st century. These
systems currently have no artificial intelligence (AI)
whatsoever, and in most cases, are simply operated
by soldiers (and on occasion terrorists and insurgents)
utilizing hardline cables and laptop-like controllers,
although wireless and satellite systems exist for the
more sophisticated national armed drone programs.
Near-term future prototypes are likely to have, at best,
independent response capabilities similar to a trained
animal due to the incorporation of expert system programming. Projections out even further, however, have
raised concerns that these emergent weapons systems,
possessing semi-autonomous and autonomous capabilities, could ultimately have the potential to evolve
beyond the machine stimulus and response level,
eventually incorporating varying degrees of weak AI,
and one day possibly even achieving a basic form of
self-awareness.
The fielding of such armed robotic systems and
the broader implications this entails has been increasingly discussed in works generated by military scholars associated with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI),
U.S. Army War College (USAWC). The origins of these
insights date at least back to the Robotics and Contemporary/Future Warfare panel, 20th Annual Strategy
Conference, “Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” held April 14-16, 2009.1 Steven Metz, the SSI
Director of Research, has since gone on to write four
1

essays on this subject related to the future of roboticized warfare (2012), the coming Landpower robot
revolution (2014), the inevitable emergence of military
robots (2016), and military challenges and opportunities of the coming robot revolution (2016).2 The present
author, a former SSI Minerva Chair, has written essays
on virtual martyrs (2014), remote controlled firearms
(2015), a conference brief on robotics and military operations (2015), a monograph on terrorist and insurgent
use of unmanned aerial vehicles (2015), and a report
concerning terrorist and insurgent teleoperated sniper
rifles and machine guns (2016).3 Finally, SSI Director
Douglas Lovelace, Jr., recently published a large collection of primary documents—along with commentary—on autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons
systems (2016).4 This monograph builds upon these
armed robotic systems-focused efforts by not only
looking into the present and then raising questions and
insights about the future, but also by drawing upon the
near, intermediate, and far historical past, to help portray both the evolutionary and revolutionary aspects
of their emergence, and their interrelationship with the
changing nature of early 21st-century warfare.
With the preceding context in mind, this monograph will initially discuss the weapons systems life
cycles analytical approach, which is militarily historical and qualitative in its methodology. This approach
distinguishes between the experimental (entrepreneurial), institutionalized, ritualized, and satirized (or
romanticized) phases that exist for an individual weapons system. It will then draw upon three case studies
related to the knight, the battleship, and the tank in
order to explain this military historical process and
provide the needed context in which to strategically
understand the expected trajectory that armed robotic
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systems may begin to progress through, if earlier
weapons systems developmental patterns hold true.
Given the U.S. Army’s great reliance on armored forces
in the modern era, special attention has been afforded
to the tank. Not only is this weapons system undergoing its own process of life cycle phase progression
into what can be argued is its ritualized phase, but it is
also projected that, at some point in the future, armed
robotic systems will be co-fielded in coordination with
tank forces. The emergence of armed robotic systems is
then analyzed from the perspective of their being in the
early stages of the experimental life cycle phase. Additionally, this monograph then discusses the new strategic realities that exist vis-à-vis the emergence of armed
robotic systems by means of posing and responding
to queries of immediate warfighting importance, as
well as additional queries and responses to broader
national security implications related to the future of
the American middle class and even humanity itself.
Finally, a number of short recommendations will be
provided to help get the U.S. Army better focused on
this new emerging component of warfare derived from
the fielding of armed robotic systems.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIFE CYCLES
Weapons systems life cycles analysis dates back to
original research primarily from the late 1980s and early
1990s that has only been sporadically published.5 For
this reason, it is relatively unknown in most military
science analytic circles. Within it, four life cycle phases
have been identified—experimental, institutionalized,
ritualized, and satirized—that can be utilized to better
understand and analyze dominant weapons technologies development over the last 2,500 years of Western
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military affairs. The life cycle approach can be applied
to both mobile (field) and static (fortification) land warfare systems, as well as naval and military aircraft systems, and as it will be shown, also to emerging armed
robotic systems. Historically, weapons systems life
cycle phases were initially measured over the course
of centuries; however, since roughly the 1830 timeframe, “historical compression” has taken place that
has resulted in some life cycle phases spanning mere
decades. Figure 1 portrays the four weapons systems
life cycle phases and the dominant theme related to
each of them.

Figure 1. Weapons Systems Life Cycle Phases.
The first phase of a weapons systems life cycle is
the experimental one. In the start of this phase, a new
weapons technology has emerged that shows great
promise for battlefield use; but the preexisting military forces and the societies that they represent do
not understand how to properly configure the novel
weapons system, much less field and logistically sustain it. The future potentials of the emergent weaponry, however, are apparent. This awareness is critical
in light of the current weapons systems state-of-theart that exists, which has exhausted is own future use
potentials (see the ritualized life cycle below). For this
reason, both the preexisting military forces and their
societies are willing to invest the time and effort into
working out how to configure, deploy, and sustain
new weapons technology. This weapons systems life
4

cycle phase is marked by trial and error experimentation and is entrepreneurial in nature. It is so entrepreneurial, in fact, that typically mercenary personnel or
younger officers—or, centuries ago, nobles—initially
championed the disruptive new weapons technology
in the face of entrenched military force and societal
interests arrayed against its development. As an example, master gunners during the latter Middle Ages were
typically military entrepreneurs who owned their own
siege artillery and worked under contract with noblemen. While viewed as being in league with demonic
forces for utilizing “fire and brimstone” devices, they
were readily contracted due to their arcane knowledge
that allowed castles to be effectively sieged.6
The second phase of the weapons systems life cycle
is institutionalized in nature. The new weapons technology has been figured out by the military forces and
their societies, and they can create, field, and sustain
what has become a mature weapons system. The focus
of this life cycle phase is optimization of the weapons
systems derived from a specific energy source, and the
technologies that exploit it. Training and procedures
become standardized, since what works and what
does not work concerning that weapons system operation is understood. Arms and armor are utilitarian in
nature, with a pragmatic compromise reached between
weight, speed, and combat power. For military forces,
this is bureaucratically the most desirable life cycle
stage—in essence, their comfort zone—with doctrine
synchronized with the state-of-the-art weapons systems and standard operating procedures determined.
Military force training and educational institutions are
both effective and efficient in their activities and produce soldiers well versed in contemporary warfighting theory and practice. For example, the origin of the
Prussian goose step—when conducted by Frederick
5

the Great’s musket carrying foot soldiers of the midto-late 18th century—was actually due to its great
military utility. This standard operating drill allowed
Frederick’s troops to precisely form and advance in
columns and then quickly deploy into lines in order to
mass superior firepower on the battlefield, giving the
Prussians increased lethality soldier-for-soldier over
the competing European armies of the era.7
The third phase of the weapons systems life cycle is
the ritualized phase. From an energy exploitation and
efficiency perspective, a weapons system has reached
the end of its S-shaped curve (sigmoid function),
where additional effort and expense placed into weapons system development yields increasingly diminishing returns. Historically, weapons systems that have
entered into this life cycle phase have become heavier
and heavier in nature due to the emergence of more
capable battlefield threats. As a result, these weapons systems costs also dramatically rise. This phase is
very dangerous for military forces and their societies
because, being conservative in nature, they are initially unwilling to acknowledge that the state-of-theart weapons systems they are building, fielding, and
sustaining are slowly becoming obsolete on the more
technologically advanced battlefield that is emerging.
Vested military and societal—including economic—
interests will politically fight to make sure the position
of their weapons systems as the dominant one is not
challenged, and, at some point, may engage in denial
and delusional thinking concerning its contemporary
effectiveness. In a desperate attempt to keep the weapons system fielded, bolt-on capabilities may even be
resorted to in an attempt to modernize it and retain
its place on the battlefield. When questions of doctrinal effectiveness are raised, the response of “If it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it” or “We have always done things
6

this way.” are provided, rather than ones focusing on
basic warfighting utility. Normally, it requires catastrophic defeat on the battlefield—in some instances
more than once, if not enough blood was initially
spilled—for intransient military and societal interests
invested in the failing weapons systems to recognize
that a new age of warfare has emerged. We can see this
with the dogged adherence to crossbowmen in some
regions of the continent and longbowmen in England,
after arquebusiers (soldiers utilizing early muzzle loading firearms) had proven their battlefield superiority
over the older weapons systems.8
The fourth phase of the weapons systems life cycle
is the satirized phase. When this life cycle stage has
been reached, the weapons systems have typically
already been removed from the battlefield. They are
universally regarded as obsolete weapons systems that
modern military forces and their societies have moved
beyond. Only primitives would field such weapons
systems—which are both comical and pathetic in their
own right—as they are viewed by contemporary military personnel as being suicidal to utilize. For example,
the quote “Whatever happens we have got the Maxim
Gun, and they have not”—relating to late 19th-century
British imperialism against indigenous peoples wielding spears—signifies that Europeans had long moved
beyond basic battlefield shock weaponry.9 A contrasting component of this life cycle phase may also be the
expression of a longing for, or romanticizing about,
days gone by, centering on the old weapons system
and those heroic military personnel who once utilized
it. As an example, the trope related to the bygone age
of “Wooden Ships and Iron Men” refers to the bravery
of the men who once were associated with the “Fighting Sail” and “Ship of the Line” of the mid-17th and
early 19th centuries.10
7

Three weapons systems life cycle case studies—
focusing on the early 9th through the mid-16th-century
knight, the mid-19th through the later 20th-century battleship, and the early 20th through the early
21st-century tank—will be provided. This author
suggests—and will detail in a later section—that we
have seen the development, maturation, and eventual
obsolescence of the knight and the battleship over the
course of history. More recently, we have witnessed
the 20th-century experimental and institutionalized
phases of the tank transitioning into its present ritualized life cycle phase. We are witnessing the emergence
of armed robotic systems (armed droids and robots)
into what will be looked back upon as the experimental phase in their life cycle.
These historical case studies thus are instructive,
vis-à-vis the contemporary rise of robotics and autonomous systems, because they help to place in strategic
context the patterns of weapons systems development
projected to take place that will influence the ongoing
emergence and military evolution of droids and drones
on the battlefield. It is, therefore, imperative to investigate these previous weapons systems’ case studies in
some detail.
The Knight
The knight was a new weapons system initially
fielded by the Western Europeans as a counter to the
depredations of the light horse cavalry raiders—such
as the Magyars from the Hungarian plain, the Arabs
from the Iberian Peninsula, and the Saracens from
North Africa—in the 9th and 10th centuries.11 To this
list of raiders can be added marauding Viking war
parties that would sack villages and towns and plunder the countryside. They utilized long ships outfitted
8

with both a sail and oars and moved by means of the
surrounding seas and inland waterways.12 The raider
threat, be it light horse or seaborne based, enjoyed
mobility advantages over the defending infantry
levees and household troops belonging to local strongmen and the Frankish, Italian, and German dynasties.
They could successfully engage in a hit-and-run raid,
and then escape before defending forces arrived or, if
mounted and forced to fight, enjoyed superior tactical
speed and standoff fighting with their use of the bow
and light lance.
Experimental Phase
As early as the Battle of Tours in 732, which resulted
in the Frankish defeat of a mounted Arab army by
Charles Martel, it became readily apparent that Western Europe was in dire need of cavalry forces for homeland defense purposes. In the battle, the Frankish host
created a large infantry square to repel the Umayyad
cavalry in the meeting between the two armies. It is
generally thought that the Franks rode to the battle on
horseback and fought dismounted in a strong defensive position—though some analysts have suggested
that Frankish cavalry may have also taken part in the
engagement.13 Over the ensuing decades, under the
Frankish leaders Charles Martel, Pepin the Short, and
then Charlemagne—the founder of the Holy Roman
Empire—the pre-conditions for the system of feudalism were gradually established in Europe, along with
the dedicated breeding and raising of horses for military purposes. While these horses may have only initially been used for logistical transport (as took place
at Tours), they took on an increasingly direct combat
role over time as mounts for Frankish cavalry forces.14
Thus, the experimental life cycle phase of the knight
9

began by the early 9th century with the initial fielding of cavalry forces by the Carolingian dynasty, and
its subsequent fielding by the Ottonian dynasty in the
early 10th century and by the early Capetian dynasty
in the later 10th century. (See Table 1 for the knight life
cycle phases.)

LIFE CYCLE

TECHNOLOGIES

SYSTEMS

BATTLES

Experimental
(Entrepreneurial)

Stirrup (9th century)
Prick Spurs (9th century)
Saddle (9th century)
Horse Shoes (early 9th century)
Thrusting (Hatch) Spear
(9th century)
Spatha Sword (9th century)
Kite Shield (10th century)
Chain Mail Suit (9th century)
Nasal Helmet (9th century)

Carolingian (9th
century)
Ottonian (early 10th
century)
Early Capetian (late
10th century)

Fontenoy (841)
Leuven (891)
Augsburg (910)
Merseburg (933)
Lechfeld (955)

Institutionalized

Horse Shoes; Advanced (11th
century)
Lance (11th century)
Arming (Cruciform) Sword
(10th century)
Cantled Saddle (mid-11th
century)
Heater Shield (later 12th and
early 13th century)
Rowel Spurs (14th century)
Chain & Plate Suit (14th
century)
Enclosed Helmet (late 12th
century)
Great Helm (mid-13th century)
Mail Trapper (13th century)
Stronger Horse Breeds
(ongoing)

Norman
(11th century)
Knights Hospitaller
(12th century)
Knights Templar
(12th century)
Plantagenet
(12th century)
Hohenstaufen
(12th century)
Teutonic Knights
(late 12th
century)

Hastings (1066)
Dorylaeum
(1097)
El Mansura
(and Fariskur)
(1250)
Mons-En-Pévèle
(1304)

Table 1. The Knight.15
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LIFE CYCLE

TECHNOLOGIES

SYSTEMS

BATTLES

Ritualized

Plate Suit (early 15th century)
Flanged Mace (early 15th
century)
Jousting Lance (15th century)
Jousting Shield (15th century)
Jousting Plate Suit (late 15th
century)
Full Barding (mid-15th century)
Embossed Armor & Shield
(15th century)

Military Order
Demise (14th
century)
Chivalric Order Rise
(14th century)

Crecy (1346)
Poitiers (1356)
Agincourt (1415)
The Herrings
(1429)
Nancy (1477)
Bicocca (1522)

Satirized
(Romanticized)

Magic Sword
Second Hand Armor

King Arthur’s
Knights
Roland The Knight
Don Quixote

Camelot (1485, +
late 5th
century)
Charlemagne’s
Era/Fantasy
(1516, early
9th century)
Windmills
“Giants”
(1605, 1615)

Table 1. The Knight. (cont.)15
The basic military puzzle faced by the Carolingians
during this historical period was how to take their
legacy foot soldiers, mount them on horses as effective
cavalrymen, and then, as a society, sustain the fielding
and maintenance of such a fighting force. This is something the ancient Romans—for all their grandeur and
military prowess—were unable to successfully achieve.
The basis of their combat forces had been the infantry
legion—backed up by superb siege, field fortification,
and logistics capabilities—but not cavalry units.16 This
is because medieval civilization would be ultimately
configured around a more advanced energy and technical base—animal versus human motive power and
far more sophisticated metallurgy—than that found in
the classical world of the early Greeks and Romans.
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The initial process of mounting Frankish soldiers
on horseback was a trial-and-error affair. Infantry
arms and armor are not suited for mounted use, and
certain pieces of hardware are also needed for the
horse itself to serve as a fighting platform. It was entrepreneurial in the sense that there was no precedent
concerning how to do this—much less any existing
doctrine to address it—with this capability built from
the ground up. A similar experimental process took
place in what had been the Eastern Roman Empire
with the emergence of the Byzantines and their eventual fielding of sophisticated cavalry turmas.17 As a
result, the Franks learned that a mail coat did not protect a rider’s vulnerable legs, a round shield resulted in
the rider’s left knee being vulnerable to attack, a short
sword was not long enough for cavalry attack purposes, and the kinetic force behind a spear thrust would
too deeply impale the intended target, rendering the
weapon subsequently useless. For the proto-knight, a
chain mail suit and a nasal helmet emerged in the 9th
century to provide better mounted-protection. Additionally, the kite shield—protecting the left knee and
the neck—developed in the 10th century. The thrusting
(hatch) spear, utilizing a crossbeam to limit spearhead
penetration, and the spatha sword, providing greater
length, were also used to outfit the mounted 9th-century Carolingian warrior. Concerning the mount itself,
roughly made horseshoes protected the hooves, basic
stirrups and a saddle kept the rider on the horse, and
prick spurs were used to prompt the horse forward
in the 9th-century.18 The thrusting spear would have
been likely used underhanded and, more often than
not, thrust into the target by the rider himself, rather
than utilizing the full kinetic energy of the horse, by
securing the spear in the crux of the arm, which would
have unseated the rider from his primitive saddle.
12

No evidence of horse barding (i.e., armor use) existed
during this lifecycle phase, as fabricated metal represented both a limited and expensive commodity, and
early warhorses likely would not have been able to
sustain the extra weight placed upon them, unlike the
later medieval breeds. Boiled leather, used as a primitive chanfron (equestrian face armor), however, could
possibly have been utilized in some instances during
the later stages of this phase.19
Some of the battles that took place during the
knight’s experimental life cycle phase were: Fontenoy
in 841, Leuven in 891, Augsburg in 910, and Merseburg and Lechfeld in 933 and 955, respectively. Given
the available details regarding the historical period
in question, the specifics of these engagements, and
information concerning the early knightly equipment
utilized in them is relatively scarce. The Battle of Fontenoy took place during the chaos of the Carolingian
civil war and resulted in the Treaty of Verdun in 843,
effectively splitting the Holy Roman (i.e., Frankish)
Empire into what would later become the modern
states of France, Italy, and Germany. At Leuven, the
forces belonging to one of the early German kings of
the Carolingian line stormed a fortified Viking base
and ended their raids against his lands. This battle took
place about 5 years after the siege of Paris that involved
about 30,000 Viking warriors. The Vikings had reached
their pinnacle of power during this era, and were one
of the factors behind the development of feudalism—
and institutionalized knights—in Europe, due to the
breakdown of central authority that resulted in the
emergence of strong point defenses under localized
warlords. In the next series of 10th-century battles, the
light cavalry forces of the Magyars achieved a victory
over the Franks at Augsburg, only to be crushed by the
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feudal cavalry forces of King Otto at Merseburg and
then again at Lechfeld, effectively ending their raids.20
Institutionalized Phase
The institutionalized phase for the knight went
hand-in-hand with the emergence of the stone castle—
that protected the lord, his family, and his retainers—
and the animal and crop focused manor economy
supporting it. This was a very different and more technologically advanced form of defense than the earlier
Carolingian burgwards. Those larger forts represented
community-based defenses utilizing wooden walls
placed around towns. As central authority collapsed
in Europe, a patchwork system of vassalage, fiefs,
and obligatory military service spread across it—as
did the knight as the dominant land warfare weapons
articulation.
The knight, during this life cycle phase, was provided with a true lance by the 11th century that could
be placed in the crux of the arm for better energy transference from a charging mount. This was made possible
with the development of the cantled saddle during the
mid-11th century. This saddle had raised back (cantle)
and front (pommel) components that better secured a
knight onto a warhorse. The spatha-type sword was
also further optimized, and had developed into what
is known as the arming sword in the 10th century. This
weapon had a slightly tapered blade used for cutting, a
cruciform shape with a larger cross-guard, so the hand
would not slip onto the blade, and a larger pommel at
the back of the grip so the hand could more securely
hold it. For better knightly protection, the enclosed
helmet was fielded in the late 12th century to cover the
face and the great helm came into use in the mid-13th

14

century to provide additional protection to the head.
As threat weaponry—from both opposing knights and
infantry forces—became more deadly, the chain and
plate suit then emerged in the 14th century. This body
armor provided increased solid metal plate protection
to the chest, arms, groin, and legs, while still allowing flexibility with chain armor coverage of the body
joints. This came, however, with the cost of increased
armor weight vis-à-vis the earlier chain mail suit that
dominated for most of this life cycle phase and offered
a better tradeoff between protection and mobility for
the knight.21 The heater shield dating from the late 12th
and early 13th century developed from the earlier kite
shield also used during this phase. It was further optimized for mounted combat by a reduction in size and
weight, but still provided adequate protection to the
vulnerable left side of the body of a mounted knight—
though some increased left knee vulnerability may
have been accepted in return for a shield surface area
conducive to the placement of heraldic symbols.22
The warhorse also saw technical upgrades, the first
of which were more refined forms of horseshoes developing from the 11th century onward, with bronze
horseshoes giving way to iron horseshoes and the use
of horseshoes themselves becoming more common.
Then the mail trapper (chain mail armor for a horse)
was fielded in the 13th century. This barding was created so that an unarmored mount could not be targeted—as it had been in some earlier battles—as the
weapons system’s weak point in order to unseat an
armored knight. Rowel spurs—which have more painful prickly blades and a jingle, making a mount nervous—then emerged in the 14th century. These spurs
were better suited to promoting a horse forward into
combat than the earlier prick spur design.23 Further, a
biological upgrade also took place for the mount, with
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larger and stronger horses such as the destrier being
bred to carry more knightly armor, as well as later
horse armor, and to provide an even more elevated
platform for advantage in shock combating against
opposing cavalry and infantry forces.
Some of the dominant institutionalized knightly
forces during this phase were those fielded by the
Normans in the 11th century, and the Knights Templars, the Plantagenets, and the Hohenstaufens in the
12th century, and the Teutonic Knights in the late 12th
century. Training for knights became standardized
during this phase by means of the apprentice system
based on young nobles and promising commoners (as
sergeants—household knights) becoming pages at the
age of 7, squires at the age of 14, and knights at the
age of 21. Field training included tournaments based
on actual battlefield tactics and some maneuvers. Basic
doctrine developed with banners, trumpets, lance pennons, and heraldic devices on shields serving as means
of troop identification and communication for limited
command and control (C2) purposes. The military-religious orders went a step further and wrote down
their doctrine, such as the Rules of the Knights Templar
that was created in 1130. As in the case of the selective breeding of horses to produce larger warmounts,
youths on the path to knighthood—either being nobility or favored by nobility (e.g., household knights)—
enjoyed considerably more protein in their diets and
martial exercises, opposed to the rest of the medieval
populations, which further physically optimized their
performance.24
Examples of institutionalized knightly battles that
took place initially can be seen with the Battle of Hastings in 1066. In that engagement in southern England,
the ad hoc English army, composed of mostly infantry backed up by some archers, was defeated by a
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combined arms force of infantry, archers, and cavalry belonging to the Normans, who had invaded
from France. The Norman knights in the battle were
repeatedly able to separate groups of defenders from
the main English army and then destroy them in
piecemeal fashion.25 The battle portrayed how a bastard son of a foreign noble—William of Normandy—
could, during this life cycle phase, win the English
crown by force of arms and become forever known as
the Conqueror. In 1097, at Dorylaeum in Anatolia, a
battle took place between a large Crusader army and
a much smaller Seljuk Turkish force. The Turks used
light cavalry armed with bows against the Crusader
infantry and knights. As took place during much of
the Crusades, the knights were initially invulnerable
to the arrows, but when they would lose their mounts,
they could become incapacitated if too many arrows
struck them. However, if the knights could somehow
engage in close combat with the Islamic light cavalry,
they would achieve victory. From the perspective of
losses, the battle ended in a draw, but the Crusaders
with their far larger numbers won the field and ended
up looting the Turkish camp.26
The next illustrative battles are those of El Mansura and Fariskur, taking place in 1250, in Egypt. In
these tandem battles between a Crusader army and the
Ayyubid dynasty, the entire Crusader force—which
included thousands of knights and their retainers—
was destroyed, with those not killed outright, captured
and enslaved. The aftermath of the battle saw the ransoming of a French king and many captured Crusaders. This battle is a prime example of the fact that, even
when a weapons system—such as the knight—is in
its institutionalized phase and an army is configured
around it, disaster can still strike. Finally, at Mons-enPévèle in 1304, French and Flanders forces took part in
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one of an ongoing series of engagements, in which the
infantry forces of Flanders fought the more balanced
French infantry and cavalry forces. This battle was
proclaimed a French victory—they drove the Flemish
from the field—even though a royal French banner
had been taken, and the casualties on both sides were
about even. This battle—and the French disaster at the
Battle of the Golden Spurs a few years earlier—signified that resolute infantry forces armed with halberds,
pikes, and related weapons (precursors to the use of
the longbow and early firearms which would usher in
the knights ritualized phase) could, in some instances,
stand up against knightly cavalry forces and, if properly utilized, even defeat them.27
Ritualized Phase
The ritualized life cycle phase for the knight resulted
from new weapons systems being fielded—ultimately
more technologically advanced—that would render
the knight obsolete as a weapons system. The twilight
of the knight was not an overnight affair, given the
low rate of technical change in the medieval and early
modern eras, with the ritualization process taking
about 175 years to take its course. In a final effort to
defensively protect the knight and their mount, full
plate armor emerged in the early 15th century and full
barding (also made of plate) by the mid-15th century.
This armor was expensive, heavy, and further limited
knightly mobility. Plate, however, was almost impervious to an arming sword striking it, resulting in the
flanged mace, a crushing rather than a cutting weapon,
being utilized by knights as a secondary weapon to the
lance in the early 15th century. Still, plate armor could
be vulnerable to the armor piercing head of an English
longbow arrow, the bolt from a later mechanical powered (as opposed to human powered) crossbow, the
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blow from a halberd that operated somewhat like a can
opener, the bullet of an early firearm, or a dirk or rondel
dagger hammered into the arm joint of a knight that
had been unhorsed and immobilized on the ground.
As can be expected, plate quality progressed along
with the threat weapons systems in defensive and
offensive iterations lasting generations. Sometimes,
plate armor could be breached and, in other instances,
still fully protect the wearer.28
As part of the knight’s later ritualization process,
two other arms and armor trends emerged. The first
turned knightly combat into entertainment by means
of making the tournament—which before had battlefield utility—into a game of sport. The jousting lance
and shield were developed in the 15th century, along
with jousting plate armor later in the same century.
This went in tandem with the elimination of the earlier knightly military orders—such as the Knights
Templars in the early 14th century—or their transformation into ceremonial bodies. At part of the same
process, new chivalric orders emerged, such as the
Order of the Garter in England in the mid-14th century, whose members were politically connected, but
not necessarily warfighters. Additionally, rather than
fulfilling the obligated military service to their lord as
a vassal, a knight could buy their way out of it. This
was preferable to the great nobles, because they could
then obtain money to afford the services of mercenary
troops who were more effective on the battlefield. The
second trend in arms and armor taking place was etching designs into swords, shields, and armor, creating
expensive inlays of silver and gold, and commissioning artistic armor pieces. Such arms and armor—
almost always plate—was worn to show societal status
and actually would be detrimental to use, given the
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vulnerable lance traps its uneven surface would
provide.29
As seen in Table 2, the arms and armor weight
of a European knight (and the warmount’s barding)
markedly increased as the system transitioned from
the experimental through the institutionalized and
then into the ritualized life cycle phase. For the first
300 years, knights carried less than 50 pounds of arms
and armor, with most of the weight being carried in
the latter half of its existence as a weapons system. At
this point, the end of the weapons system’s S-curve
had been reached. While the slow demise of the knight
had long become an accepted fact in European land
warfare, it was not until the fielding of the Spanish
heavy musket in 1530 that the knight was universally
deemed obsolete. That musket performed like an antiknight gun, with a 2-ounce lead ball traveling at such
a high velocity that not enough armor could be placed
on a knight to survive the impact and still have any
form of fighting mobility left.30 The more advanced
battlespace dynamics and increased energy foundations of the modern era had finally won out over the
last vestiges of medieval civilization, just as Charles
VIII’s siege artillery, by 1498, had reduced the traditional castle into rubble. The arms and armor of the
knight have since ended up in old castles and museum
collections. Still, it should be remembered that, with
the eventual demise of the knight, the need for heavy
cavalry itself did not fade away from European land
warfare. Rather, a new cavalry weapons system would
emerge in the mid-16th century that was much lighter.
This combatant would be equipped with a helmet,
a breastplate to turn a pistol ball shot, heavy boots
to provide some protection to the legs, two or three
wheel-lock pistols to perform the caracole maneuver,
and a sabre for cavalry charges.31
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Battles that are illustrative of the increasing ritualization of the knight begin with Crecy, fought in
1346. This engagement was part of the campaigns of
the Hundred Years’ War between the English and the
French. The battle not only saw the initial deployment
of the early field cannon, but more importantly, signified the very beginnings of the knight’s obsolescence as
a weapons system. The superior use of terrain, benefits
of wet weather, and combined arms approach of the
greatly outnumbered English allowed them to create a
killing zone in front of their defensive position. More
than 1,000 French knights repeatedly charged into this
zone and were cut down—along with their mounts—
by volleys of armor piercing arrows shot off by massed
longbowmen. As part of the ongoing English and
French war, that battle was followed up by that of
Poitiers taking place in 1356, and Agincourt in 1415. At
Poitiers, French knights and their retainers were once
again defeated. As at Crecy, they attacked up the center
against a holding English infantry force, with arrows
raining down on them and their mounts. However, in
this engagement, they came close to punching through
the lines and caused far more English casualties.
Finally, at Agincourt, the French knights and their supporting men-at-arms, once again, repeated their earlier
mistakes by attacking through a plowed and muddy
field against a line of infantry with archers on secure
flanks protected by sharpened stakes. The armor of the
French knights was much heavier at Agincourt than
at Crecy, which offered them better protection. However, their mounts did not have full barding, which
made them vulnerable to the masses of arrows shot at
them. Dismounted French knights in the battle, on the
other hand, quickly became exhausted as they moved
forward through the sodden fields. The end result of
the battle was a slaughter of the attacking French force,
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with some thousands of the French knights killed.32
The French had fallen into the deadly life cycle trap of
always doing things the same way because they had
worked in the past. Furthermore, they combined rigid
doctrine with the hubris of seeing themselves as the
only true soldiers on the battlefield, and the social betters of the common and lowly born English rabble that
poured arrows down upon them and their mounts in
one engagement after another.
Other representative battles of the ritualized phase
included those of the Herrings in 1429, Nancy in 1477,
and Biocca in 1522. The Battle of the Herrings took
place between the English and a larger French and
Scottish force. It was an auxiliary action involving an
English supply train being interdicted on its way to
the siege of Orléans. The supply train was made into a
laager with sharpened stakes protecting it. The attacking Scottish infantry, followed by the French knights,
were cut down by the English longbowmen and then
routed in a flanking attack. At Nancy, nobles belonging to Burgundy and Lorraine engaged in a battle that
included a large contingent of Swiss fighting for Lorraine. The smaller Burgundian force situated itself in a
strong defensive position, but was outflanked prior to
the start of the battle. It was then attacked from behind
by the mass of Swiss mercenaries, who used their pike
and halberds to good effect against the Burgundian
knights and in the process wiped out most of their army.
Then, at Biocca in the early 16th century, a French and
Venetian army squared off against Habsburg forces in
a battle dominated by artillery fires, arquebusiers, and
field fortifications. In this engagement, not only were
the Swiss pikemen technologically outclassed, but the
cavalry forces—that included noblemen—were only
used in an auxiliary role on the wings. Within this
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operational environment, frontal cavalry charges were
considered suicidal in nature.33
CENTURY
FIELDED

ARMS & ARMOR (FOR
HORSE) WEIGHT IN
POUNDS

LIFE CYCLE

Carolingian:
Mail Coat,
Spangen Helmet,
Round Shield,
Wing Spear,
Spatha;
(No Horse Armor).

Early 9th

38 lb (0 lb) est.

Experimental

Norman:
Mail Suit,
Nasal Helmet,
Kite Shield,
Light Lance,
Arming Sword;
(No Horse Armor).

Mid-11th

49 lb (0 lb) est.

Institutionalized

Teutonic:
Mail Suit,
Enclosed Helmet,
Heater Shield,
Medium Lance,
Arming Sword;
(Mail Trapper).

Late 13th

59 lb (50 lb) est.

Institutionalized

Valois:
Full Plate,
Great Helm,
Heater Shield,
Heavy Lance,
Flanged Mace;
(Full Barding).

Early 15th

79 lb (75 lb) est.

Ritualized

Tudor:
Jousting Armor,
Great Helm,
Jousting Shield,
Heavy Lance;
(Full Barding, Caparison).

Mid-16th

115 lb (80 lb) est.

Ritualized

KNIGHT

Table 2. Increase in European Knight Weight
(early 9th through mid-16th century).34
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Satirized Phase
The satirized (romanticized) life cycle phase for the
knight can initially be viewed in the King Arthur and
Knights of the Round Table mythos written by Thomas
Malory in Le Morte D’Arthur (The Death of Arthur) published in the late 15th century. Tales of Camelot, the
magical sword Excalibur, intrigue and sorcery, and the
brave and virtuous knight Sir Lancelot—whose forbidden love for the queen resulted in civil war breaking
out—were all components of this early work.35 This era
saw a final surge in popularity in the tournament—as
part of this weapons system’s earlier ritualization process—and romanticized perceptions of knighthood,
which by now was a dying institution. This work was
followed a century or so later by the expressly satirical publication The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote
of La Mancha, produced in two volumes in 1605 and
1615, by Miguel de Cervantes. By this time, the magic
and virtuous elegance of Camelot had been replaced
by the madness of a poor Spanish nobleman—brought
about by the reading of too many knightly romantic
novels—who goes on a quest wearing second-hand
armor, on a broken down horse, and with a simple
peasant farmer as his faithful squire.36 Don Quixote made monsters out of windmills and was such a
pathetic caricature that it universally became accepted
that only a madman would dress up like a knight and
go off to war on the more technologically advanced
European battlefield, which had emerged. An earlier
and lesser-known early 16th-century satire also exists.
It was Orlando Furioso (Mad Roland), written by Matteo
Boiardo. It focuses on the knight Roland, during the
time of Charlemagne in a fantasy setting, who is
mad when the lady he loves runs off with a common
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Saracen foot soldier. The timing of the work signified
the loss of status for the knight with the rise of gunpowder-based weaponry.37
The Battleship
The battleship was the successor naval weapons
system to the wooden, masted-with-sails, and cannon-carrying ships of the line that sailed the high seas
from the 17th through the mid-19th century. These
warships had descended from 16th-century armed galleons that, in turn, had evolved from the early modern
trading carracks and medieval cogs.38 Ships of the line—
also known as “battleships of the line”—were based on
ratings, with the first rate warships having the most
powerful broadsides of cannons. Beginning in 1815,
and extending to about 1900, a number of technical
advances took place that allowed for the gradual emergence of experimental battleships and the eclipse of the
older ships of the line. These initial advances were seen
in the smoke stacked warship USS Demologos, built in
1815 with its steam engine and paddle wheel; screw
propellers replaced the paddle wheel on the British SS
Archimedes completed in 1839; and in 1841, the French
deployed the Paixhans gun, (developed earlier in 18221823, which fired exploding shells) on its warships.39
Still, for roughly a 45-year period between 1815 and
1860, ship of the line-like ships still dominated naval
warfare, although they were increasingly retrofitted
with coal-fired steam engines and more lethal naval
guns that could splinter wooden warship hulls.

25

Experimental Phase
As a result of these advances, by 1860, the first
experimental battleship had been commissioned—
the French warship Gloire. This ocean going warship
signifies the beginning of the battleship experimental
weapons system life cycle phase. (See Table 3 for the
battleship life cycle phases.) The 5,618 ton Gloire relied
upon armor plating over its hull for protection, was
steam and screw propeller powered, and carried rifled
guns that fired explosive shells.40 The much larger
British warships were then completed, HMS Warrior in 1861 and HMS Black Prince in 1862, displacing
10,315 tons with iron plating and teak backing.41 All of
these warships carried their naval guns in a broadside
configuration and still retained masts and sails. The
revolving turret main gun design then appeared in a
retrofit of the HMS Trusty in 1861, which was a floating
ironclad battery dating back to the Crimean War. This
battery had been completed in 1855 and, along with a
few other English and French ones like it, were highly
influential in promoting the initial experimental battleships of the 1860s as well as the later use of armored
turrets.42 In fact, during the next year in 1862, at the
Battle of Hampton Roads between the CSS Virginia
and the armored turreted USS Monitor, this technical
advance was utilized in combat.43
The other later technical developments that took
place during this life cycle phase were: the use of the
armor piercing shell in 1867—known as Palliser shell—
that remained in service into the early 20th century;
all steel hull construction, as well as the gradual elimination of sails from early battleships, beginning in the
1870s; and the initial emergence of warship radios, initially dated to 1900, with its use by both the Russian
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and Japanese navies during the Russo-Japanese War
of 1904-1905 taking place.44 Some notable battleships
from this era were the French Redoubtable, commissioned in 1878, which used steel as the main building
material; the HMS Inflexible with an underwater armor
deck, commissioned in 1881, as a model for central citadel ships; and the HMS Colossus, commissioned in
1886, with two main breech loading gun turrets at the 1
and 7 o’clock positions to the central smokestack, with
limited zones of cross-deck firing—somewhat like the
HMS Inflexible—but also with the placement of a charthouse above the forward bridge.45 Also of note were
the USS Texas, commissioned in 1895, and considered
America’s first battleship, although it had a 2nd-class
rating, two staggered main turrets, and a strange 360°
perimeter smaller turret arrangement; and the HMS
Canopus, which was the first ship of the class commissioned in 1899, with a 16,038 combat tonnage displacement, shallower draft, and additional 6-inch main
guns (12 instead of 10), specifically meant for the China
Station.46
The post-Hampton Roads naval battle representative of this life cycle phase was the Battle of Lissa that
took place in 1866 between Italian and Austrian Empire
forces. In this engagement, numerous ironclads with
steam engines and sails participated, as well as many
unarmored steam powered warships. The battle was
an Austrian victory even though their fleet was outnumbered, witnessed not only rifled artillery broadsides, but also armored ships ramming each other and
other unarmored warships.47 The Battle of Manila Bay
in 1898, between the U.S. and Spanish fleet, secured the
United States as a great naval power in the world and
resulted in the final demise of Spain’s colonial empire.
It was an engagement solely comprised of protected
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(armored) and unprotected (unarmored) cruisers or
smaller warships rather than battleships. The Battles of the Yellow Sea in 1904, and Tsushima Strait in
1905, between the Russian and Japanese fleets were
also fought, which culminated in a major victory for
the Japanese in the later battle. At Tsushima Strait, the
two fleets fielded about a dozen battleships and almost
three-dozen cruisers in the battle, with most of the Russian battleships sunk in the engagement.48 The Battle
of Lemnos in 1913, which took place during the First
Balkan War between the Ottoman Empire and Greece,
was also composed of small fleets of pre-Dreadnought
warships. It resulted in a Greek victory.49 Finally,
the World War I Battle of Cape Sarych, in 1914, witnessed a minor engagement between a small Russian
fleet, which included five pre-Dreadnought-class warships, against a more modern, yet even smaller, fleet of
Ottoman warships that included a very powerful and
advanced battlecruiser.50 Of these naval engagements,
the ones in which the U.S. and Japanese fleets prevailed were the most significant. Due to those engagements, both nations achieved great power status and
realized that only those navies with the most advanced
and larger forms of battleships had any chance of prevailing in battle—of which the British were even more
acutely aware.
Institutionalized
The institutionalized life cycle phase of the battleship began in 1906 with the commissioning of the
HMS Dreadnought. Virtually overnight, the emergence of this British warship made all battleships
built before her obsolete. Thereafter, all battleships
were then described as either pre- or post-Dreadnought
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class warships. This sizeable warship displaced 24,466
tons of combat weight and carried five 12-inch dualmain gun batteries. She was faster, better armed, and
more heavily armored than any of her predecessors.
The major technical innovations of this warship that
became institutionalized in future battleship and battlecruiser (a lighter armored variant) designs were as
follows:
• Multiple main gun turrets of uniform size;
Protection against underwater attack—can
• 
withstand two torpedo explosions in any
position;
Steam turbines for increased speed, lower
• 
center of gravity (which allowed for heavier
armament), improved reliability, and reduced
maintenance costs—resulted in more deployment time at sea;
• The ability to utilize oil fuel—signified the shift
away from coal-fired engines; and,
• Tripod masting.51
As expected, the combat power of the HMS Dreadnought was quickly surpassed with new classes of
battleships derived from its innovative design commissioned both by British and foreign fleets. In turn,
the growth in size and firepower of U.S. post-Dreadnought institutionalized warships can be seen in the
new post-Dreadnought battleship classes that were produced. The increases in combat load tonnage and main
battery gun size from the South Carolina-class commissioned in 1910, the Florida-class of 1911, the New Yorkclass of 1914, the Nevada-class of 1916, the Colorado-class
of 1923, and the North Carolina-class of 1941 showcase
this process. Ultimately, the tonnage and main battery
size increased from 20,048 tons and eight 12-inch guns
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from 1910 to 52,382 tons and nine 16-inch guns for the
1941 class commissioning, with interim classes showing both incremental tonnage increases and transitional
14-inch gun batteries for the New York and Nevada-class
battleships.52 The size of the U.S. battleships—as well
as those belonging to other nations—would have
increased more quickly, but the Washington Naval
Treaty ratified in 1923, between some of the major
World War I great powers, placed a limit on their size
and total fleet tonnages to stop a naval arms race. Battleships were limited to 35,000 tons standard displacement and aircraft carriers slightly less depending on
the construction method utilized—derived from a new
carrier or preexisting battleship hull. By the mid-1930s,
the future Axis powers of World War II had generally
ignored the Washington and follow-on London Naval
treaties of 1930 and 1936.53 An additional important
technical development during this lifecycle phase was
the later deployment of search-and-fire control radars
placed on battleships. Experimental testing of these
systems took place in the later 1930s. These systems
were deployed on U.S. battleships in 1941.54 The other
major World War II naval powers also fielded such
systems by this time, with Japan and Russia lagging a
few years behind.
Institutionalized phase battleship engagements
can initially be seen in the World War I naval battle of
Jutland on May 31-June 1, 1916. This major battle took
place in the North Sea by Denmark, and represented
the archetypical and most celebrated naval engagement of the entire life cycle phase. It was comprised of
more than 200 warships, and pitted the dreadnoughts
and battlecruisers of the British Grand Fleet and the
Imperial German’s High Seas Fleet against each
other—though a number of German pre-Dreadnoughts
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were also involved in the fighting. While British warship and personnel casualties were much more significant than those of the Germans, the aftermath of the
battle resulted in the German fleet never again challenging the much more powerful British fleet. Of note
was the use of more lightly armored battlecruisers in
the opposing battle lines that resulted in their taking
the bulk of the capital warship losses.55
The action at Denmark Straight in May 1941 is then
representative of a World War II institutionalized battleship engagement. It took place between a small hoc
grouping of battleships, a battlecruiser, and heavy
cruisers belonging to the British and German fleets.
The lone battlecruiser involved—the HMS Hood—was
sunk in the engagement by the massive (more than
50,000 combat tonnage displacement) battleship Bismarck. The German victory was short lived, however,
as the Bismarck, now all alone in the Atlantic Ocean
off France and attempting to get back to a safe port,
was hunted down by a sizeable British naval taskforce.
While the steering mechanism of the Bismarck was
disabled by carrier aviation during an early phase of
the multi-day engagement, her fate was sealed by full
broadsides from two British battleships and then her
intentional scuttling.56 The U.S. and Japanese battleship duels off Guadalcanal, in November 1942, were
also representative of this battleship phase. Additionally, Surigao Strait in October 1944—as an engagement
within the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf between the U.S.
and Japanese fleets—represented the last clash of battleships in wartime.57 Strategically, these naval battles
were sideshows within the larger context of American
and Japanese aircraft carrier operations taking place.
Thus, they also symbolized the battleship’s ritualized
phase of growing weapons system obsolescence.
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LIFE CYCLE

TECHNOLOGIES

SYSTEMS (COMMISSIONED)

BATTLES

Experimental
(Entrepreneurial)

Steam Engine (1815)
Explosive Shell Firing
Guns (1822-1823)
Screw Propellers
(1839)
Armor Plating (1859)
Revolving Turret
(1861)
Armor Piercing Shell
(1867)
Shipboard Radio
(1900)

Gloire (1860)
HMS Warrior (1861)
CSS Virginia (1862)
USS Monitor (1862)
Redoubtable (1878)
HMS Inflexible (1881)
HMS Colossus (1886)
USS Texas (1895)
HMS Canopus (1899)

Hampton Roads
(1862)
Lissa (1866)
Manila Bay
(1898)
Yellow Sea
(1904)
Tsushima Strait
(1905)
Battle Of Lemnos
(1913)
Cape Sarych
(1914)

Institutionalized

Uniform Main Battery
(1906)
Electronic Fire Control
(1906)
Steam Turbines
(1906)
Search and Fire Control Radar (1941)

HMS Dreadnought
(1906)
USS South Carolina
(1910)
USS Florida (1911)
USS New York (1914)
USS Nevada (1916)
USS Colorado (1923)
USS North Carolina
(1941)

Jutland (1916)
Denmark Strait
(1941)
Sinking Of The
Bismarck
(1941)
Surigao Strait
(1944)

Ritualized

Anti-Aircraft Batteries
(1943)
Cruise Missiles
(1980s)
Close Defense
Systems (1980s)
Electronic Warfare
(1980s)

Yamato (1941)
USS Iowa (1943; 1980s
Retrofits)
USS Montana
(Canceled 1943)

Pearl Harbor
(1941)
Coral Sea (1942)
Midway (1942)
Leyte Gulf
(1944)
East China Sea
(1945)

Satirized
(Romanticized)

Alien Technology

Yamato (1941; Salvaged
Wreck)
USS Missouri (1944;
Maritime Museum)

Space (2010;
2199)
Hawaii (2012)

Table 3. The Battleship.58
Ritualized Phase
The beginning of the ritualized phase for the battleship can be clearly traced to World War II with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.59
The American battleship line was in port during the
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attack and was severely crippled, with the USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma destroyed, and the USS California and USS West Virginia sunk, but later refloated
and returned to service, along with other battleships
and smaller warships having been either damaged or
sunk.60 Even after this engagement, the Japanese high
command projected a final Jutland-style engagement
between the battleship fleets of Japan and the United
States to decide the outcome of the naval war.61 For
this reason, the monster battleships of the Yamato-class
with 81,546 maximum tonnage and nine 18.1-inch
main guns were commissioned in 1941, and 1942 for
the sister ship Musashi. However, by the battles of the
Coral Sea in May 1942, and Midway in June 1942, it
was clearly evident that the age of carrier aviation had
eclipsed the big guns of the armored battle line. The
top of the S-curve for the battleship weapons system
had been reached. With this realization, in 1943, the
U.S. Navy canceled the planned USS Montana-class
battleship with a 75,040 maximum tonnage displacement and 16-inch guns meant to compete with the
Japanese super battleships. The already existing battleships in the U.S. fleet—especially the USS Iowa-class
64,344 maximum tonnage which began to be fielded
in 1943—became relegated to shore bombardment and
anti-aircraft artillery fleet protection roles with nine
16-inch, twenty 5-inch, eighty 40-mm, and forty-nine
20-mm guns mounted on them, respectively.62 The Japanese super battleships, on the other hand, suffered a
much grimmer fate for, off Okinawa in April 1945, the
Yamato was sunk by U.S. carrier aircraft—in what was
in essence a suicide mission—during the Battle of the
East China Sea. The Musashi had earlier suffered a similar demise in October 1944 during the Battle of Leyte
Gulf.63
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A number of the Iowa-class battleships were then
deactivated and activated on and off again during the
Cold War, with a final round of 1980s retrofits (e.g.,
“bolt-ons”) placing cruise missiles, Phalanx close-in
weapon systems, electronic warfare suites, and even
early scouting RQ-2 Pioneer unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) on them in a final attempt to stave off their obsolescence and as a partial counter to the Russian Kirov
nuclear powered battlecruisers then being deployed.64
One of the number of factors that resulted in the passing of the battleship was its intensive manpower needs
based on an older naval model derived from principles
of mass industrial manpower use. The USS Iowa was
decommissioned for the last time in 1990, the USS New
Jersey and the USS Wisconsin in 1991, and the USS Missouri in 1992, with all four warships since being turned
into floating museums.65
What is telling during the ritualized life cycle phase
for the battleship is its increasing weight, vis-à-vis the
earlier life cycle phases due to the need for more and
larger armaments and heavier armor. This can be seen
in Table 4, with U.S. battleships during the experimental phase displacing between 6,315 and 20,160 maximum tonnages, during the institutionalized phase
displacing between 20,048 and 52,640 maximum tonnages, and during the ritualized phase displacing
between 64,344 and 75,040 (canceled) maximum tonnages. What cannot be seen is that the new dominant
naval warship, the aircraft carrier, which was in its
institutionalized phase during World War II, displaced
between roughly 25,100 to 30,260 Yorktown-class and
roughly 30,800 to 36,380 (Essex-class) maximum tonnage.66 The aircraft carrier did not have to rely upon
heavy armor for defense against opposing warships
because the lethality of its aircraft was measured in a
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few 100 miles rather than roughly 20 miles for large
naval guns. Hence, the battlespace dynamics of the aircraft carrier were clearly superior to that of the battleship, just as the knight was outclassed by the similar
dynamics of infantrymen utilizing the standoff Spanish heavy musket.67
BATTLESHIP

YEAR
(COMMISSIONED)

DESIGN/MAXIMUM
DISPLACEMENT
(U.S. TONS)

LIFE CYCLE

Maine (2nd Class)

1895

-------/6,682

Experimental

Texas (2nd Class)

1895

-------/6,315

Experimental

Indiana (BB-1)

1895

10,453/11,523

Experimental

Iowa (BB-4)

1897

11,346/12,779

Experimental

Virginia (BB-13)

1906

15,188/16,742

Experimental

Connecticut (BB-18)

1906

17,920/20,160

Experimental

South Carolina (BB-26)

1910

17,920/20,048

Institutionalized

Florida (BB-30)

1911

24,444/26,208

Institutionalized

Nevada (BB-36)

1916

30,800/32,368

Institutionalized

Colorado (BB-45)

1923

36,512/37,621

Institutionalized

South Dakota (BB-49)

1923 Canceled

48,384/52,640

Institutionalized

North Carolina (BB-55)

1941

47,040/52,382

Institutionalized

South Dakota (BB-57)

1942

47,040/49,699

Institutionalized

Iowa (BB-61)

1943

58,240/64,344

Ritualized

1943 Canceled

72,800/75,040

Ritualized

Montana (BB-67)

Table 4. Increase in U.S. Battleship Weight
(1895-1943).68
Satirized Phase
The final weapons system life cycle phase for the
battleship would normally be satirical in nature;
although, in this instance, given the great esteem
still held for the old battlewagons in some nations’
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collective psyches, more of a romanticized perspective
has so far been expressed. In the 2010 Japanese science
fiction live-action film, Space Battleship Yamato, set in
2199, the wreck of the warship sunk in 1945 is rebuilt
into a space-faring battleship derived from alien technology. In final combat against the invading Gamilas,
the Yamato once again engages in a suicide mission—
as it had originally done in the Battle of the East China
Sea. In this instance, the sacrifice made by the warship
and the lone captain manning it saves humanity from
the dreaded aliens.69 In the 2012 science fiction film Battleship—based loosely on the peg, slot, and plastic ship
game of the same name—an alien invasion of Earth has
begun, centered on the Hawaiian Islands, which have
been isolated by a force field. The initial engagement
between the alien warships and the two U.S. and one
Japanese destroyers, deployed to Hawaii for a naval
exercise and ending up within the force field area,
resulted in their destruction. A small number of surviving officers and crew fall back to Pearl Harbor and
plan a counterattack utilizing the battleship USS Missouri that had been turned into a floating museum. The
USS Missouri, hastily made ready for combat, sailed
out of Pearl Harbor against the alien warships with a
skeleton crew comprised of museum volunteers (geriatric former crewmen) and the surviving naval personnel. In the final battle with the alien mothership, 1940s
American technology, along with equal measures
of improvised tactics and pure luck—as well as contemporary U.S. naval airpower, once the force field is
turned off in the final climatic scene—saves the day.70
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The Tank
The tank was the mechanical successor weapons
system to the venerable cavalry mount. Cavalry was
rendered technologically obsolete, vis-à-vis the static
combat conditions found on the Western Front of
World War I, as fortified trench lines were built from
the Swiss border upwards to the North Sea. Artillery
and machine gun fires covered the expanse between
the trench lines. Furthermore, the ground was difficult
to traverse with shell holes and fields of barbed wire
impeding mobility. This resulted in cavalry charges
and infantry assaults becoming suicidal in nature, with
the consequence that the soldiers of entire battalions
“going over the top” could be mowed down in their
assault formations.71 In an attempt to break this bloody
stalemate, in early 1915, the British came up with the
concept of the tank—an armored and tracked vehicular soldier transport—that would allow troops to both
safely cross no man’s land between the opposing trench
lines and penetrate through the enemy’s trenches.72
A number of technologies were combined to create
the initial tank design—the first being the internal
combustion tractor engine, which was developed in
the 1890s. The gasoline traction engine replaced the
earlier steam-based engine in various types of agricultural machinery and tractors.73 The second technical
advancement was the emergence of the gasoline powered crawler tracker in 1907 that utilized caterpillar
treads instead of tractor wheels. It was patented and
manufactured by the Holt Manufacturing Company of
Stockton, California.74 It helped to form the conceptual
basis of subsequent commercial and military tracked
vehicles. This was followed by the third technical
advancement, which was the mounting of armor on
gasoline-powered vehicles. Such initial armoring took
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place with the 3-ton French Charron armored car, initially produced in 1904. It was followed by a number
of other armored car systems being fielded, including
the Rolls Royce armored car in 1914.75
Experimental Phase
The experimental (entrepreneurial) phase for the
tank initially began with the fielding of the British No.
1 Lincoln (Tritton) Machine and Little Willie in August
and December of 1915, respectively. (See Table 5 for
the tank life cycle phases.) These unarmed prototypes
had rear steering wheels like the follow on Mother and
Mark I designs, but were quickly outmoded, as were
the steering wheels in a few years’ time.76 With the
inclusion of the vehicular mounted gun, in 1916, on
the British Mark I tank, the system was able to target
opposing forces with either cannons (used against
guns, fortifications, and defenses) or machine guns
(used against infantry). The types of weapons carried
were dependent on whether the design variant was
“male” or “female”; still, both designs were meant
to operate in coordination with one another, with the
female tanks more greatly outfitted with machine
guns.77 Since early tanks were experimental in nature,
they did not look like the later institutionalized weapons system, with some even having 8 or 9-man crews—
and one, the 36-ton German A7V Sturmpanzerwagen,
even having an 18-man crew. Hence, some of the initial
designs were extremely large in size and alternately
looked like a set of massive rhomboid tracks (the British Mark series), a big armored box (the French Schneider and St. Chamond), or a mobile armored fortress
(the German A7V).78 The emergence of the revolving
gun turret, in 1917, on the tiny two-man French Renault
FT-17 provided that light tank with better fields of fire
for its main armament and helped toward the tank’s
38

later institutionalized design.79 American experimental phase tanks that were fielded included: the M1917
tank, which was a licensed production model of the
Renault FT-17; the Anglo-American MVIII Liberty,
which was based on the British Mark series and initially produced to a limited extent in 1918; and the M1
Combat Car light cavalry tank, which was deployed in
1937.
Illustrative battles during the experimental life
cycle phase of tanks were: Flers–Courcelette, which
took place in September 1916; Cambrai, which took
place in November-December 1917; Villers-Bretonneux, which took place in April 1918; and Saint-Mihiel,
which took place in September 1918. Flers–Courcelette
represented in the first use of tanks in battle and can be
considered, at best, a tactical surprise over the defending Germans. Because so few tanks were involved—
fewer than 50, with fewer than a dozen making it over
to the enemy’s trench lines—the initial impact of this
system was somewhat limited.80 Tanks were then used
by the Allies en masse at Cambrai, portraying their
operational utility. The initial attack consisted of 476
tanks that allowed for a significant penetration of the
heavily fortified enemy lines.81 Villers-Bretonneux signified the first tank-on-tank engagement, taking place
at about 3 miles per hour between a handful of British
Mark IVs and a German A7V. The outcome was inconclusive, with both sides taking some damage to their
systems.82 Finally, at St. Mihiel, American Expeditionary Forces were involved in an assault on the German
trench lines, in coordination with early armor forces,
with about 400 tanks supporting the combined American and French offensive.83 These early engagements
were reflective of the fact that early tanks were slow
moving and unreliable machines subject to frequent
breakdowns. Some were even prone to tipping over in
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the devastated terrain of no man’s land and the front
trench lines. Still, this weapons system proved superior to preexisting forces such as cavalry, and was a
major reason the allies were able to break the trench
stalemate on the Western Front.
LIFE CYCLE

TECHNOLOGIES

SYSTEMS (FIELDED)

BATTLES

Experimental
(Entrepreneurial)

Internal Combustion
Tractor Engine (1890s)
Crawler Tractor (1907)
Vehicular Armor (1904,
1914)
Vehicular Mounted Gun
(1916)
Revolving Gun Turret
(1917)

No 1 Lincoln (Tritton)
Machine (1915)
Little Willie (1915)
Mark I (1916)
Mark IV (1917)
Renault FT-17 (1917)
M1917 (1917)
MVIII Liberty (1918)
M1 Combat Car (1937)

Flers–Courcelette
(1916)
Cambrai (1917)
Villers-Bretonneux (1918)
St. Mihiel (1918)

Institutionalized

Low Hull Profile (1935)
Sloped Armor (1936)
Radio Equipped (1940)
Gyrostabilizer (1942)
Smoke Dischargers (Early
1940s)

Panzer IV (1937)
T-34 (1940)
M4 Sherman (1942)
M48 Patton (1952)
M60 (1959)
M1 Abrams (1980)
T-90 (1993)

Invasion Of
Poland (1939)
Kursk (1943)
Arracourt (1944)
Chawinda (1965)
Golan Heights
(1973)
73 Easting (1991)

Ritualized

Turbine Engine (1980)
Reactive Armor (1982)
Depleted Uranium Armor
(1988)
Digital Upgrades (2000)
Electromagnetic
Armor (2002)
Active Missile Defense
(2009)

O-I (1943)
Panzer VIII Maus
(1943)
T28 (1945)
A39 Tortoise (1946)
M1A1SA Abrams
(1989)
M1A2 Abrams (1992)

Highway 80 and
Highway 8
(1991)

Satirized
(Romanticized)

Punk Paraphernalia

M5A1 Stuart (1941
With 1969 Cadillac
Eldorado Sections)

Australia (1995;
2033)

Table 5. The Tank.84
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Institutionalized Phase
The institutionalized weapons system life cycle
phase of the tank was achieved by the late 1930s with
the fielding of the German Panzerkampfwagen IV
(PzKpfw IV or Panzer IV), and the invasion of Poland.
This phase saw the merging of this weapons system
with World War I Hutier (trench infiltration) tactics,
along with supporting combined arms into the German
Blitzkrieg (lightning war) operational approach.85 The
emergence of the tank’s modern form took place,
based upon a single turret with a main gun, a few
machine guns for self-defense, a more streamlined
profile with sloping armor, a hull length track on the
right and left side of the vehicle, and a four- to fiveman crew. Autoloader mechanisms would replace the
need for a main gun loader crewman in some of the
later tank systems. Some of the technical advances supporting the final institutionalization of the tank can be
found in the low hull design of the French Char B tank
fielded in 1935 and sloped armor incorporated into the
French SOMUA S35 cavalry tank fielded a year later
in 1936.86 Additionally, by 1940, radio equipped tanks
became standard, with the German army in support of
its Blitzkrieg operational doctrine.87 This was in contrast to French doctrine, which stressed tanks as infantry support—that reflected a still very experimental
perspective—and thus did not see the need for radio
equipment being placed in all their systems.
The German Panzer IV in 1937, the Russian T-34
(76 mm) in 1940, and the American M4 Sherman in
1942 can be considered the initial institutionalized
tank systems not only fielded but also mass-produced,
with 8,500 Panzer IVs, 35,000 T-34s, and 49,000 Shermans built. Once the institutionalized life cycle phase
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was achieved, the additional technical advances for
the tank were optimization focused. This meant more
deadly main armaments and better gunnery accuracy,
higher levels of protective armor and crew survival,
and more powerful and higher efficiency engines were
developed over time. For example, the United States
had begun to outfit some of its tanks with a gyrostabilizer by 1942 to greatly improve gunnery while the
vehicle was on the move.88 Additionally, smoke dischargers were fitted to some German tanks—such as
the Tiger I—in the early 1940s as an additional upgrade
for combat survivability.89 For U.S. tanks, the increase
in gun size and engine horsepower (hp) can be easily
witnessed with the evolution from the M4 Sherman in
1942, the M48 Patton in 1952, the M60 in 1959, and then
to the M1 Abrams in 1980. Gun size increased from 75
mm to 90 mm to 105 mm for the latter two tanks, with
an eventual 120 mm upgrade for the M1IP Abrams in
1984, while engine power increased from 400 hp to 650
hp to 750 hp and then to 1500 hp. The amount and quality of tank armor also increased in the same manner;
although, given metal and composite density, hull and
turret angles, and the different armoring levels placed
on the various parts of a tank—no easy metric exists
to convey this progression. Suffice it to say, an M4 had
1-2 inches of World War II era armor on it, while an
M1 has well over 10 inches of advanced armor protecting it. The same optimization process also took place
over the course of decades for foreign tanks, including
those belonging to the Russians, British, and Germans.
Examples of institutionalized tank battles from
World War II were the invasion of Poland in September-October 1939, Kursk in July-August 1943, and
Arracourt in September 1944. Later battles taking
place during this weapons systems life cycle phase
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were Chawinda in September 1965, Golan Heights
in October 1973, and 73 Easting in February 1991.
The invasion of Poland was in many ways an armed
German rehearsal for the later conquest of France in
May-June 1940. More than 3,000 tanks were involved
in the combined arms invasion that overran Western Poland within a few weeks. While the defending
Poles had about 800 tanks at their disposal, they were
mostly light reconnaissance and older systems—such
as Renault FT-17s—that were utilized following older
infantry focused doctrinal approaches.90 The Battle of
Kursk later took place in Western Russia in a salient in
the German front lines. It was the largest tank engagement in history, with about 3,000 German and 5,000
Russian tanks taking part. The battle resulted in a
crushing defeat for the German army and an immediate Russian offensive with thousands more tanks
being committed from reserve divisions.91 The Battle
of Arracourt, in turn, took place between U.S. and
German armored forces in the province of Lorraine,
France as part of a German counteroffensive against
recent allied gains. Hundreds of tanks were involved
in the battle, with about 75 percent of the German tanks
either destroyed or made non-operational. More than
40 Shermans were also lost in the fighting, but given
U.S. production rates, those losses were quickly made
up; unlike the greater German losses, which resulted
in 86 tanks being destroyed.92 The Battle of Chawinda took place some decades later in Pakistan. About
200 M48 Pattons and Shermans on the Pakistani-side
were fielded against an equivalent number of British
Centurions and Shermans on the Indian-side in a territorial dispute. It was considered a Pakistani victory,
with a United Nations ceasefire resulting in an end to
hostilities.93 The Golan Heights battle then took place
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between Israeli and Syrian tank forces as a component
of the Yom Kippur War. About 170 Israeli tanks—
including upgraded British Centurions—successfully defeated an attacking force of about 1,200 Syrian
tanks—mostly Russian T-55s—during a 4-day battle in
which the Israel position commanding the heights was
almost overrun.94 Finally, the 73 Easting engagement
during the first Gulf War resulted in a number of U.S.
Abrams cavalry troops decimating two Iraqi brigades
composed of Russian T-72s and T-55s. More than 300
Iraqi tanks and supporting armored personnel carriers
(APCs) were destroyed by the fast moving American
armored forces.95
Ritualized Phase
The ritualized life cycle phase of the tank represents
its transition from being a dominant and optimized
weapons system to one that is becoming obsolete. In
order to stave off obsolescence, the weight of a weapons system will continually increase to provide it more
defensive capacity; and eventually, bolt-ons will be
added in order to provide it with new capabilities that
were not initially organic to it. As a by-product of the
ritualization process, the cost of the weapons system
also dramatically increases as the top of the S-curve
function has been reached with diminishing returns
on investment taking place. Some of the technologies
that could be considered ritualizing in nature include
the fielding of reactive armor on Israeli tanks in 1982,
depleted uranium on the Abrams in 1988, and early
British explorations into the use of electromagnetic
armor beginning in 2002, which goes beyond a conventional physical defense and into fifth dimensional
energy shielding capabilities.96 The use of missile
defense systems on tanks—such as the Israeli Trophy
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system in 2009—that engages in hard kills of incoming
rounds also recognizes the level of increasing threats
modern armor is facing.97 Further, the very placement
of a 1,500 hp gas turbine engine into the Abrams tank
in the first place in 1980 somewhat blurred the line
between its institutionalized and ritualized phases.
While a brilliant technical advancement, the placement of an engine into a tank, derived from helicopter
engine design experience, is beyond the systems original technical parameters, given its aerospace pedigree.
In 2000, the onboard Abrams upgrades from analog to
digital—meant to extend the life of a mass industrial
weapons system by providing it with information age
capabilities—are also definitely way beyond the institutionalized design of the tank as a fighting platform.98
An early cluster of tank ritualization actually took
place between 1943 and 1946, with a number of oversized tank prototypes having been developed. These
included the Japanese 0-I in 1943, the German Panzer
VIII Maus in 1943, the American T-28 in 1945, and
the British post-war A39 Tortoise in 1946. The weight
in tons of these behemoth vehicles were in the 87- to
207-tonnage range, far exceeding the normal U.S.
main battle tank tonnage of 33.5 to 46 tons during this
period.99 This cluster of oversized tank building exploration, however, subsided once World War II had
ended, with institutionalized tank production remaining dominant for another 40 to 45 years. The actual
crossing of the tank into its ritualized phase, it can be
argued, took place in roughly 1989, with the development of the M1A1SA Abrams weighing 67.6 tons
full combat weight (FCW). While no bright line exists
between the institutionalized and ritualized phases, as
can be viewed in Table 6, U.S. tank tonnage has incrementally increased to the point that, by 1989, a modern
U.S. main battle tank weighed twice as much as the first
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institutionalized U.S. tank—the 1942 M4A1 Sherman,
which weighed 33.5 tons. The weight of the Abrams
series has since increased to 71.3 tons for the M1A2
System Enhancement Package (SEP) V2 in 2005, and to
73.6 tons for the M1A2 SEP V3 set for 2017. This weight
does not include mission specific add-ons such as the
Tank Urban Survival Kit (TUSK), other protective systems, and mine plows/rollers. In fact, the Abrams is
getting exceedingly close in weight to the German
Tiger, Model B (King Tiger) that was fielded in 1944,
which weighed 75 tons and was meant for defensive
operations and the initial phase of strong defensive
line breakthroughs.100 That tank was underpowered—
unlike the Abrams with its turbine engine—it burned
large quantities of fuel, suffered from transportation
issues due to its great weight, had trouble maneuvering
in compact urban terrain, and was too wide and heavy
for many bridges, just like the modern day Abrams.
The increase in U.S. main battle tank weight is a
result of both its conventionally maturing and, increasingly, from information age threats being directed
against this weapons system. These include the 125
mm main guns of new generations of opposing tanks—
such as the 50-ton Russian T-90 and the 55-ton Chinese
Type 99A2—and a host of anti-armor rockets and missiles that can be launched by individual soldiers and
other platforms, such as helicopters and unmanned
drones.101 Cluster bomblets and top-down attack munitions fired from artillery and rocket systems are additional concerns, as are precision-guided bombs and
cruise missile-like systems. A clear example of these
threats in action is the United States engagement of the
fleeing Iraqi forces from Kuwait on Highway 80 and
Highway 8 in February 1991. In what can be considered an engagement of the tank in its ritualized phase,
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more than a thousand soft and armored vehicles—
including tanks—were destroyed by superior U.S.
airpower backed up by supporting fires.102 An earlier
example of related threats include the loss of a number
of 63- to 65-ton (Mk I to Mk IV) Merkava tanks in the
Summer of 2006 in Southern Lebanon to Sagger antitank missiles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
utilized by the Hezbollah fighters.103 About 80 Abrams
series tanks have also been knocked out of action in
Iraq—requiring them to be shipped back to the United
States—following the invasion in March 2003 by local
insurgent forces.104 This is far more Abrams tanks than
were ever damaged by Iraqi armor and portrays the
fact that, while the United States prefers to engage in
conventional and even ritualized conflict as some have
argued, many of its state and nonstate opponents have
since gone down the path of asymmetric, hybrid, and
terrorist-insurgent forms of warfare.105
As a response to the changing nature of warfare and
a shift away from mass industrial armies, the increasing Department of Defense (DoD) budgetary pressures, and the fact that the United States presently has
thousands more Abrams series tanks than is needed for
its force structure requirements, additional tanks and,
therefore, new tank production are no longer wanted
by the Army or, for that matter, the Marine Corps.
This programmatic decision is in variance to corporate
and Congressional district interests that, for economic
reasons, seeks to produce more tanks or at the very
least continues to upgrade older preexisting Abrams
models into more advanced configurations.106 This
aspect of the tank’s ritualization process is not unexpected and would be akin to good old boy networks
of knight commanders or battleship admirals, and the
vested political and economic interests that go with
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them, attempting to promote their legacy weapons systems in the face of radically changing battlefield conditions brought about by military technical advances.
TANK (GUN)
T1 (57 mm Bow)

YEAR
(1ST FIELDED)

WEIGHT
(U.S. TONS)

LIFE CYCLE

1925

22

Experimental

M2 (37 mm)

1939

19

Experimental

M2A1 (37 mm)

1940

23

Experimental

M3A1 Lee/Grant (37 mm, 75 mm
Bow)

1941

32

Experimental

M4A1 Sherman (75 mm)

1942

33.5

Institutionalized

M4A3E8 Sherman (76 mm)

1944

37.1

Institutionalized

M26 Pershing (90 mm)

1944

46

Institutionalized

M48 Patton (90 mm)

1952

50

Institutionalized

M48A1 Patton (90 mm)

1954

52

Institutionalized

M60 (105 mm)

1959

51

Institutionalized

M60A1 (105 mm)

1961

52.5

Institutionalized

M60A2 (152 mm
Gun/Missile Launcher)

1973

57

Institutionalized

M60A3 (105 mm)

1979

57

Institutionalized

M1 Abrams (105 mm)

1980

60

Institutionalized

M1IP Abrams (120 mm)

1984

62.5

Institutionalized

M1A1 Abrams (120 mm)

1985

65

Institutionalized

M1A1SA Abrams (120 mm)

1989

67.6

Ritualized

M1A2 Abrams (120 mm)

1992

67.6

Ritualized

M1A2 Abrams SEP V1 (120 mm)

1999

67.6

Ritualized

M1A2 Abrams SEP V2 (120 mm)

2005

71.3

Ritualized

M1A2 Abrams SEP V3 (120 mm)

2017

73.6

Ritualized

M1A2 Abrams SEP V4 (120 mm)

Forthcoming

Forthcoming

Ritualized

Key: For the M60 system and beyond verified FCW is utilized. This includes production
weight, full load of ammunition, fuel, and supplies. This does not include additional kits
that are mission dependent: add-on armor kits, active protection systems, mine plows/
rollers, etc.

Table 6. Increase in U.S. Main Battle Tank
Weight (1925-2017).107
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Satirized Phase
The tank, since it is still a dominant yet aging weapons system in the armies of the major world powers,
has not yet—like the knight or battleship before it—
entered its satirized (or romanticized) phase. Being a
crewmember of a modern main battle tank is not currently a suicidal proposition. In fact, Abrams crewmen
causalities have been exceedingly low in conventional
battles, though this can also be viewed as reflective
of a “zero defects”—take no causalities—mentality
as a component of the ongoing ritualization process.
Further, in urban terrain, qualitative tank advantages
are of course readily lost; and when less sophisticated military organizations, such as the Iraq army
under Saddam Hussein, engage more technologically advanced ones, such as the military forces of the
Unites States, this calculation is altered. The closest we
presently have to a satirized view of the tank comes
from the 1995 Australian post-apocalyptic punk movie
Tank Girl. Set in 2033 Australia, the anti-heroine drives
around in a 1941 M5AI Stuart that is fused with the
front and back sections of a 1969 Cadillac Eldorado.108
This movie, however, is out of character with the dominant tank narrative that presently exists today, which
still views this weapons system as an effective fighting
machine; though, from an Army programs perspective,
a more nuanced legacy or slowly obsolescing view, is
being taken on the tank. A case in point is the 2014 film
Fury about the exploits of a Sherman tank crew set in
Europe in the final days of fighting in April 1945.109 That
graphic combat film so resonates with many of today’s
military personnel’s view on the tank’s combat power
that it could just as well be set during the second Iraq
War. This narrative is in line with the 2015 book, The
Fires of Babylon, that documents the victory of Eagle
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Troop at the Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq in 1991, which
pitted the U.S. M1 series Abrams against Russian-built
T-72 and T-55 tanks.110
ARMED ROBOTIC SYSTEMS EMERGENCE
Derived from the previous analysis, armed robotic
systems can be readily recognized as still being in their
initial experimental (entrepreneurial) life cycle phase
(see Table 7). Modern militaries—with the United
States in the lead—have been engaging in a trial and
error process of developing and fielding these systems
for about 15 years. This entire process is a result of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initially placing airto-ground missiles on a Predator drone in 2001. This
event was prompted by a mission in October 2001
directed at Mullah Mohammed Omar—the Taliban
leader—as part of the global U.S. response to the 9/11
attacks carried out by al-Qaeda.111 Predator drones
have existed since 1995 when they were first deployed
to Bosnia. Until the attempted targeted-killing of
Mullah Omar, however, they had only been utilized
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
missions.112
Experimental Phase
The technologies being utilized for both air and
ground armed robotic systems have initially focused on
teleoperated C2 derived from satellite and other forms
of communications links. Typically, one or more pilots
and controllers are situated in a control center where
they are remotely connected to the vehicle. They are
provided with feeds of what the unmanned vehicle’s
sensors can perceive, which is typically real time (or
near real time) visible and infrared video displays at
a minimum, as well as potentially synthetic-aperture
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radar for air systems.113 For some of the armed ground
robots, audio feeds may also be provided. This teleoperated capability was then combined with placing
weapons on the drone or droid. For U.S. drone systems, the preferred ground attack munition is the airto-ground missile AGM-114 Hellfire (and Hellfire +)
series, although the multi-mission UAS MQ-9 Reaper
can also carry guided bomb unit GBU-38 joint direct
attack munitions (JDAM), or GBU-44/B Viper Strike
guided bombs. Air-to-air capability also exists with
the option to include up to eight AIM-92 Stinger shortrange air-to-air missiles on the newer armed drones.114
Israeli patrol ground robots have also been in existence
for about 6 years patrolling on the border with the Gaza
strip. A newer system was deployed in early 2016 and
will be fitted with a remote controlled machine gun in
2017.115 Online social media videos of small arms—a
revolver, semi-automatic pistol, and auto-shotgun—
being placed on hobbyist drones also exist.116 Further,
from the terrorist and insurgent side, IEDs have been
placed on hobbyist drones in Syria and used in combat,
and small-improvised bombs have also been dropped
from such drones in Syria.117
The dominant armed U.S. drone systems are
the MQ-1 Predator, which is its basic armed version fielded in 2002, as well as the larger and more
advanced MQ-9 Reaper, an even more heavily armed
system, which was deployed in 2007. These systems
are being followed by additional upgrades and new
airframes, which include the MQ-1C Sky Warrior/
Gray Eagle introduced in 2009, as well as the proposed
MQ-“X” Avenger, which has been under development
since 2012.118 The payload capacity of these systems
has increased from 450 lbs for the MQ-1 to 3,850 lbs
for the MQ-9, as these armed robotic units have gained
in offensive capability. About 165 Predators and 177
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Reapers existed as of early 2016 in the U.S. Air Force
inventory alone.119 The Israeli ground systems of significance are the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)
Guardium initially fielded in 2009, which has since
been replaced by the UGV Border Protector in 2016.
While presently fielding only unarmed teleoperated
robotic systems, this program is transitioning over to
armed systems next year as previously mentioned.
Plans exist to deploy up to 350 Border Protectors that
are essentially driverless Ford F-350 pickup trucks.120
The major battles of the armed robotic systems’
experimental phase are still few in nature and can be
considered more an ongoing campaign and program
rather than battles themselves. The actual engagements, however, in terms of individual armed drone
attacks, have been quite numerous when actual U.S.
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations
against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and the Islamic State,
are counted. The first major campaign of this life cycle
phase is the Global War on Terror (GWOT), launched
by the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Since
2009, this global campaign has seen 473 strikes killing
“between 2,372 and 2,581 combatants.”121 Given the
classified nature of this counterterrorism program,
the data provided is incomplete, with more than 1,000
armed drone missions easily projected as having taken
place since the end of 2001. The second major initiative—in this instance, a program, rather than a military
campaign—is related to the future arming of Israeli
Border Security teleoperated systems that have been
fielded since 2009. This program, if broadened from
the Gaza border to other Israeli state borders, has the
potential to be quite large in size, although it would still
be dwarfed by the ongoing-armed drone operations
being conducted by the United States in many regions
of the world. A third major armed robotic initiative had
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the potential to begin to take place in the 2004 to 2008
period during the Iraqi counterinsurgency, but was
never fully implemented. It likely began with a teleoperated Multi-Function Agile Remote-Controlled Robot
(MARCbot) armed with jury-rigged claymores being
entrepreneurially deployed by a U.S. infantry unit to
clear insurgents in urban terrain.122 It was followed in
June 2007 with the initial Special Weapons Observation Remote Direct-Action System (SWORDS)—a weaponized TALON robot variant with a mounted M249
machine gun—deployment in Iraq. These systems suffered mechanical aiming glitches and also possibly ran
afoul of slowly emerging DoD armed robotic system
policy concerns, which resulted in that system and its
related components—such as the Telepresent Rapid
Aiming Platform (TRAP) that is a static teleoperated
small arms platform—not being allowed to engage
enemy insurgents.123 These events took place while
more than 5,000 unarmed robots were, by that time,
deployed to Iraq by the United States for bomb disposal, scouting, and related activities.124
LIFE CYCLE
Experimental
(Entrepreneurial)

TECHNOLOGIES
UAS (2001)
Teleoperated C2
(2001)
Missiles (2001)
Jury-Rigged Claymores
(Mid-2000s)
Machine Guns
(2007)
Bombs (2007)
IEDs (2015)

SYSTEMS

BATTLES

Armed Predator
(2001)
MQ-1 Predator
(2002)
Marcbot (Mid-2000s)
MQ-9 Reaper (2007)
Talon (2007)
MQ-1C Sky Warrior/
Gray Eagle (2009)
MQ-“X” Avenger
(2012; Dev)
UGV Guardium
(2009)
UGV Border Protector
(2016)

Global War On Terror
(2001)
Iraqi Counter-Insurgency (Mid-2000s)
Israeli Border
Security (2009)

Table 7. The Armed Drone / Droid.
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These national efforts are not alone. More than 80
countries around the world are actively engaging in
research and development (R&D) in robotic warfare
and other forms of non-human conflict.125 Further,
many violent nonstate actors including insurgents, terrorists, and even drug cartels are beginning to deploy
these systems—such as Islamic State IED drones
emerging in December 2015—although the cartels have
so far only utilized them to transport narcotics and for
surveillance purposes.126 Of these efforts, the Russian
and Chinese armed robotic systems programs are of
greatest concern. While the Russian armed robotic
system program has remained far behind the United
States, that country is investing more resources into
its research and development efforts. Emerging Russian systems include a humanoid military robot, aerial
drones, tank drones, and assorted robotic military
vehicles.127 Contrary to recent Russian disinformation
attempts, however, 10 heavily armed robots were not
utilized in Syria in December 2015 in support of Assad
regime forces to fight the insurgents as reported.128
With regard to the Chinese armed robotic program, it far exceeds current Russian initiatives. A
small tracked teleoperated system—somewhat like
the American SWORDS combat robot—that can carry
an assault rifle, machine gun, grenade launcher, or
a heavier anti-tank recoilless rifle was unveiled in
November 2015 by a Chinese defense firm at a robot
conference and trade show held in China.129 A Chinese
firm then produced a drone V-750 helicopter with a
500 km range that in June 2016 successfully test fired
50 kg anti-tank missiles—such as the HJ-9 or HJ-10—
at targets.130 China is also producing cheap, armed
drones in large numbers, such as the CH-3, CH-4, and
CH-5 series, for global export at a fraction of the cost
of high-end U.S. armed drones. While these drones
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have limited endurance and payloads, they are apparently considered good enough for those countries
which have purchased them, including Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, and
Nigeria.131 Further, according to a U.S. DoD report
published in April 2015, China is estimated to be on
track to produce more than 41,800 unmanned systems
by 2023.132 These initiatives are taking place within the
context of ongoing U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission concerns over the intellectual
property theft of U.S. robotics research due to targeted
hacking and a massive drive in China to build millions
of robot workers.133
All of the above armed robotic systems, initiatives,
and programs that have been discussed are teleoperated focused. This is partially due to the fact that we
are still in the early stages of the experimental phase
related to these weapons systems, and concerns exist
in many countries about providing such systems with
autonomous engagement capabilities. While some of
the previously discussed advanced armed robotic systems have semi-autonomous, and even limited autonomous capabilities, these are for routine activities such
as following programmable Global Positioning System
(GPS)-based flight patterns and engaging in sensor
sweeps. Exceptions exist, such as with the South
Korean manufacturer, DoDAMM, having created the
Super aEgis II, which is intended to engage targets
kilometers away in areas of the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) between North and South Korea. This weapons system has also been exported to the United Arab
Emirates.134 The Samsung SGR-A1 armed robot sentry
was developed even earlier and is also meant for DMZ
use. It was utilized in 2006 by deployed South Korean
troops to defend their bases in Iraq. The system utilizes speakers, a microphone, and a password protocol
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so troops entering the bases would not be engaged by
the system.135 Still, these are very much representative
of experimental phase systems and are quite primitive
in regard to expected weapons system developments.
Those developments are related to more advanced
technologies incorporating higher-level expert systems, networking, collective swarm decision-making,
and likely weak, but potentially even gray-area and
strong AI capabilities in the decades to come.136
NEW STRATEGIC REALITIES
The weapons systems life cycles analyzed—derived
from the historical case studies of the knight, the battleship, and the tank—have direct applicability to the
emergence of the armed robotic systems characterized in the preceding section. In the case of the knight,
the raider threat—Arab and Magyar light horse and
Viking—resulted in the replacement of the foot soldier
by the mounted soldier fulfilling the role of shock cavalry. In the case of the battleship, advances in naval
gunnery made the wooden ships of the line incapable
of surviving such attacks. This resulted in an entirely
new form of warship to be created that would better
incorporate the technical advances of that historical
era. In the case of the tank, the demands of trench warfare and the inability of infantry and cavalry to cross
no man’s land effectively resulted in the incorporation
of the new technologies that developed into a brand
new weapons system. As a result of the development
and institutionalization of the tank, cavalry forces
were made obsolete on the conventional battlefield.
In each incidence analyzed, the new weapons system
was more technologically advanced than the one it
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replaced and had more energy potential at its disposal
for superior battlefield performance purposes.
The experimental phase for the knight spanned
approximately the early 9th century (from the cavalry
forces of the Carolingian dynasty) to the early to mid11th century (the institutionalized military system of
the Norman), amounting to about 225 to 250 years (see
Table 8). The experimental phase for the battleship
spanned from 1860 (with the commissioning of the
French Gloire) to 1905 (just prior to the commissioning of the HMS Dreadnought), which totals 45 years.
The experimental phase for the tank spanned from
1915 (with the fielding of British Little Willie) to 1936
(just prior to the fielding of the German IV), which is
21 years; although, it can be argued that the first institutionalized operational use would be the invasion of
Poland in 1939, making it 24 years.
This same life cycle historical compression can also
be generally seen with their institutionalized phases.
The institutionalized phase for the knight spanned the
early to mid-11th century (with the rise of the Norman
military system) to just prior to the Battle of Crecy in
1346 (marking the beginnings of its ritualized phase),
which is about 295 to 320 years. The institutionalized
phase for the battleship spanned from 1906 (with the
commissioning of the HMS Dreadnought) to the 1941
Bombing of Pearl Harbor (or, at the very least, the
naval battles of the Coral Sea and then Midway, both
taking place in 1942), which is 35 to 36 years. The institutionalized phase for the tank spanned from 1937
(with the initial fielding of the Panzer IV) or 1939 (with
the invasion of Poland) to either 1989 (with the weight
increase of the Abrams M1A1SA upgrade to 67.6 tons)
or 1991 (the Highway 80 and Highway 8 annihilation of Iraqi armor forces by U.S. airpower and their
precision munitions), which is 50 to 54 years for the
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lower and upper ranges. While the institutionalized
phase time span of the battleship should, intuitively,
be longer than the institutionalized phase time span of
the tank, or at the least be on par with it, the ascendency of the aircraft carrier—the competitor capital
warship that replaced the battleship for fleet striking
power—altered this equation.
WEAPONS SYSTEM
Knight
Battleship
Tank

EXPERIMENTAL PHASE

INSTITUTIONALIZED PHASE

225 to 250 years

295 to 320 years

45 years

35 to 36 years

21 to 24 years

50 to 54 years

Table 8. Initial Weapons Systems Life Cycle Phases
(Length in Time).
Drawing upon this analysis, the emergence of
armed robotic systems and strategic questions pertaining to them can be better placed in historical context,
that is, as they relate to military technical advances,
identifiable weapons systems life cycle developmental
patterns, and their interactions with changes in warfare over time. The questions of immediate warfighting importance—given the new strategic realities that
armed robotic systems likely portend and the analytical responses to them—are discussed next.137
What Threats or Technological Advances Are
Armed Robotic Systems Being Fielded to Contend
With?
The U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing
global war on terror (GWOT) have resulted in a campaign to precisely identify, target in time and space,
and eliminate violent nonstate actor personnel belonging to al-Qaeda (and later the Islamic State), as well
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as personnel belonging to their terrorist and insurgent
allies in various geographic clusters throughout the
world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.138 This has been made possible due to advances in drone technology—with the
fielding of the initial MQ-1 Predator and later MQ-9
Reaper—that have allowed for the secure teleoperation of these systems from command centers in the
United States for mission purposes.139
Because the use of armed drones initially took
place under the auspices of black and shadow operations—as a response to the blurring of criminality and
warfare the al-Qaeda threat represented—rather than
as a traditional military component of warfighting,
and the fact that the program incrementally increased
in size over the course of many years, it did not necessarily threaten manned conventional aircraft systems,
their constituents, or political lobbies. Additionally, on
another level, flying drones (i.e., armed robotic systems) against terrorists was not initially considered
real warfare by many senior military officers. This
would be like knight commanders viewing early firearm users as engaging in a somewhat strange, yet still
not threatening, side activity. This further helped to
ensure the early survival of this new weapons system
along with U.S. Governmental support at the highest
level.140
What Present Weapons Systems May Armed
Robotic Systems Make Obsolete?
The most immediate impact has been on manned
aircraft as they relate to ISR and ground attack missions taking place in insurgency type environments.
Drones have proven themselves to have more utility
than manned aircraft in the role of loitering over the
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battlespace for long periods of time while conducting
ISR against violent nonstate forces—an MQ-1 Predator
can loiter for 24-26 hours, as opposed to an A-10 Warthog which, while carrying a larger munitions load, can
loiter on station for only about 2.5 to 3 hours.141 The
larger drones can remain airborne for much longer
periods of time than manned aircraft and do not suffer
pilot fatigue or, if they do, the remote pilot can be easily
switched out at the controlling installation, unlike a
manned aircraft that must return to its airbase for new
flight personnel. The same benefits for drones exist
over manned aircraft in ground attack missions, the
loss of a drone will be met with less U.S. public outcry
than a pilot being killed, captured and ransomed, or
tortured and killed for propaganda purposes by violent nonstate entities.
At this point in the experimental phase of armed
robotic systems, no current weapons systems are
threatened with obsolescence—only certain manned
mission types being conducted against violent nonstate forces. It is apparent that drone use will begin to
spread to ISR and ground attack missions in conventional combat environments, as has taken place with
the Russian aligned forces in Ukraine.142 Further,
manned helicopters, fighters, and bombers will also
begin to see teleoperated C2 systems emergence. Armed
robotic emergence is not limited to aircraft systems,
and at some point, it will readily affect both ground
and naval systems. While the United States has the
technical lead in developing teleoperated ground systems, it has stumbled in their actual fielding in combat,
with a failed attempt made in 2007 related to the initial
SWORDS deployment in Iraq. At the same time, while
violent nonstate actors technologically lag behind in
such systems development, they are far more willing
to deploy primitive versions of them into the field—as
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took place in Syria since 2012, and later in Iraq, with
teleoperated sniper rifles and machine guns—as they
have been doing with drones.143 Still, it can be argued
that the Switchblade® armed tactical drone system has
since quietly succeeded where SWORDS failed. That
system, known as a “loitering munition,” has increasingly been deployed since about 2011-2012 to U.S.
infantry troops. It blurs the line between a traditional
light mortar and an armed robot by utilizing a teleoperated drone shot from a mortar-like tube that can
remain in the air for 15 to 30 minutes (depending on
the version) and then precisely be delivered against a
designated target.144
How Are Armed Robotic Systems More
Technologically Advanced (and Have More Energy
Potential at Their Disposal) Than the Legacy
Weapons Systems They May Be Eventually
Replacing?
In the specific case of drones, the weapons systems
do not require a cockpit for manned control, allowing the human support and interface space saved to
be utilized for other functional areas and/or a reduction in size of these systems. Unmanned systems also
have higher maneuverability than manned ones in
regards to greater G-force (gravitational force) tolerance because no onboard biological entity is being
utilized to pilot these crafts. Controlling a system
remotely via a satellite link—in essence, making it the
physical avatar of a virtually linked pilot—also represents far more advanced space-time dynamics than
having the pilot physically co-located with the craft.
These technical advances, however, will likely pale in
comparison to emergent ones derived from autonomous systems—expert through limited AI—that may
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engage in collective swarm decision-making as these
systems are networked together in increasingly larger
numbers.
From the perspective of having more energy potential at their disposal, drones—being in their experimental phase—do not presently have any apparent energy
foundational advantage over preexisting and legacy
weapons systems. Clear advantages existed for knights
over infantryman, with their animal energy basis, as
did battleships with their steam (later steam turbine)
engines over wooden wind and sail warships. This can
also be seen with tanks that drew upon international
combustion engines, as opposed to cavalry that drew
from an animal energy-based source. The expectation
is that, at some point, drones will utilize advanced
fuel cell technology for their basic energy requirements, taking them beyond the modern mechanical
energy-based paradigm.
How Do We Know When We Have Achieved the
Institutionalized Life Cycle Phase of Armed
Robotic Systems?
We may not initially know when we have crossed
from the experimental into the institutionalized life
cycle phase of armed robotic system utilization. In
fact, this may or may not be something that can only
be gained from military historical hindsight. While
the HMS Dreadnought provided a clear “fire break”
with earlier classes of experimental battleships, no
such clear and universal awareness marked the emergence of the institutionalized knight. Contrastingly, in
the case of the tank, the new German way of ground
warfare and emerging tank systems—especially the
Russian T-34 that achieved the best mix of offensive,
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defensive, and mobility tank attributes with high
production rates—during World War II proved that
this weapons system’s institutionalized phase had
been reached. Of course, standardized production of
ground-based (droid) or air-based (drone) systems in
the hundreds—if not eventually thousands or tens-ofthousands—may also be an indicator that system institutionalization has been achieved.
One of the major determinants of this life cycle
phase will be the difference between successive teleoperated, semi-autonomous, and autonomous C2
(e.g., human or machine control) approaches for
armed robotic systems. This will make determining
when the armed robotic systems’ institutionalized life
cycle phase has been achieved far more complex than
determining tank institutionalization. For instance, the
U.S. Armed Forces may achieve institutionalization of
what it considers to be teleoperated C2 armed robotic
systems, specifically drones such as the MQ series
systems. Such institutionalization could even later
extend to land warfare droids—though such systems
are presently lagging far behind in their battlefield
deployment, as was previously mentioned. Still, this
may only represent a mini or false weapons systems
lifecycle for armed robotic systems within the context
of more advanced semi-autonomous and autonomous
system developments. In fact, strategically, it may suggest that the American way of war has remained far
more 20th-century human control focused—as would
be expected of the winners of the Cold War—than
opposing armed forces—specifically Russian, Chinese,
and nonstate entity derived ones—which may promote 21st-century semi-autonomous and autonomous
control systems.145
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How Many Years Will the Experimental Life Cycle
Phase of Armed Robotic Systems Span?
Drawing from the analytical response to the above
question, a simple experimental life cycle phase will
likely not exist as historically took place with the
knight, battleship, and tank. Rather, sequential ones
will take place depending on the C2 approach taken
with teleoperated human, expert system, and weak
and strong AI variants potentially utilized. From the
perspective of solely teleoperated drones, these systems have been in their experimental phase for 15
years. If we draw upon the tank experimental phase
time frame of 21 to 24 years and accept the fact that
historical compression is increasing, shortening the life
cycle phases themselves, then the expectation is that
the drone utilized for ISR and ground attack purposes
in insurgent environments may exit its experimental
phase and transition over to its institutionalized phase
in the near-term in the United States. This, however,
represents only a small component of the larger wave
of armed robotic systems experimentation and differing C2 approaches that is taking place in fits and starts
throughout the U.S. armed services.146
What Are the Implications of the Ritualized Life
Cycle Phase of the Tank on the Experimental Fielding of Armed Robotic Systems?
The expectation is that ongoing lobbying will take
place to promote the development and production of
a follow-on battle tank to the M1 Abrams series. If this
is unsuccessful—which so far appears to be the case—
then a continued push for yearly upgrades to older
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Abrams will be promoted. It is unknown if future
SEP upgrades into 2017, and potentially beyond, will
retain the present 73.6 tonnage for this tank or if it will
once again see an incremental rise in its full combat
weight, taking this weapons system deeper down the
path of ritualization. Further, the U.S. military does
not presently need or even want such upgraded tanks
and, given the expense of such upgrades, opportunity
costs exist vis-à-vis the fielding of armed robotic systems and other forms of advanced weaponry.
Additionally, given that manned systems, such as
tanks, are the dominant component of deployed U.S.
land warfare forces, the historical concern exists that
the ritualized mentality relating to “If it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” or “We have always done things this way”
will suppress armed robotic ground unit experimentation in overseas theaters. This already seems to be
the case, given that industry has produced a number
of armed teleoperated ground systems, yet, U.S. military forces have not utilized any of them in combat.
In this case, it would represent a self-imposed and
unofficial teleoperated ground combat robot ban,
although, teleoperated weapons appear to fall under
the official DoD guidance relating to autonomous and
semi-autonomous functions in weapons systems. In
that case, the restrictions placed on the use of these
systems to minimize failures and unintended engagements may be so high as not to make the present risk
of the liability inherent in using them worth the warfighting utility that they may provide.147 Still, the possibility of creating armed robotic wingmen controlled by
Abrams tank crews while on the move have recently
been raised but, at this point in time, these are still only
notional ideas.148 Armed robotic U.S. tanks will likely
be inevitable at some point in the future, as the success
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of programs such as the Switchblade armed tactical
drone further help to usher in additional armed teleoperated robotic systems. In the meantime, the Russians already appear to be taking a blended strategy
with the fielding of their new T-14 Armarta tank. This
tank—which is much lighter than the Abrams—utilizes both an unmanned (teleoperated) turret and a
main gun autoloader. Consequently, the Russians are
beginning to implement robotic concepts within their
main battle tank designs that are more advanced than
contemporary U.S. and British systems.
Besides the defined set of strategic questions
already highlighted concerning the emergence of
armed robotic systems, two other national security
related questions—one potentially threatening the
American middle class (the backbone of a free and
democratic people), and the other potentially threatening the human species itself—should be posed.
What Are the Implications of Fielding Armed
Robotic Systems—and for That Matter Industrial
Robots—Vis-à-Vis the Integrity of the American
Middle Class?
A social class within a nation is only strong and
vibrant when it has economic and military utility, that
is to say, it is integral to the functioning of society for
economic production and war making. For decades
in American society, it has been recognized that the
middle class strata has been thinning out as mass manufacturing/industrial, middle management, and other
blue collar and semi-skilled positions (e.g., shopkeepers and travel agents) have either gone offshore or been
replaced entirely due to the information revolution.
Early inklings of this trending draws upon Vonnegut’s
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“Player Piano” effect and the accompanying dystopian
futures derived from rampant automation resulting in
droves of out of work humans.149 On the warfighting
side, America no longer fields mass-industrial armies
as it once did during the First and Second World Wars
of the early and mid-20th century. Rather, it relies
upon a much smaller professional military force,
with contractor support, as well as private military
corporations in its overseas deployments.150
The increasing utilization of robots in industry as well as their emergent deployment in military
operations—potentially writ large—over the coming
decades suggests that current U.S. forces, composed
of a small group of citizens, could further be reduced
in size, with a personnel mix then composed of even
fewer professional troops supported by private military (e.g., mercenary) and armed robotic systems. Such
a personnel mix, if and when it takes place, needs to be
closely monitored because it is not democracy enhancing. Rather, it raises concerns related to the plutocratic
insurgency form isolated in an earlier SSI monograph.
Such an insurgency form promotes the agendas of globalized autocrats, authoritarian regimes, and predatory capitalism-focused multinational corporations.151
What Are the Implications of Armed Robotic Systems Proliferation—Especially Semi-Autonomous
and Autonomous Systems—on the Human Species?
Reservations have been raised in a number of international quarters concerning the ethics and morality of
fielding armed robotic systems.152 Historically, any time
a major change in weapons systems technology develops, pushback related to the norms of war and how
soldiers die on the battlefield takes place. Soldiers, and
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the societies that field them, have expectations concerning what weaponry and techniques are allowable in
organized warfare between belligerents. This has been
seen repeatedly with bans and prohibitions placed on
crossbows, firearms, and related systems, with those
military entrepreneurs violating the accepted norms
of behavior being labeled as criminals and other pejorative terms. Early firearm users, for example, were
viewed by many knights as being in league with the
devil and, if captured, were extrajudicially put to death
on the spot. While some new weapons systems are
considered so heinous in nature that international bans
have been both enacted and maintained against them,
such as chemical and biological agents, semi-autonomous and autonomous systems do not appear to meet
such criteria on their own. Booby-traps and landmines
have long operated as autonomous systems based on
“if-then” point detonation commands, although new
interpretations of international law are attempting
to challenge the usage of such weaponry, as they are
indiscriminate in their targeting. Standoff semi-autonomous and autonomous weapons systems—such
as those carrying air-to-ground missiles and utilizing
small arms—in essence thus conceptually represent
an advanced form of booby-trap or landmine. Those
utilizing motion sensors in their fields of fire can be
modified in their targeting activation by identification
friend or foe (IFF) inhibitors, although this leaves them
vulnerable to enemy spoofing and systems hacking
attempts. Such “dumb” or semi-intelligent systems
should not be considered any more of a threat to the
human species than earlier forms of autonomous—yet
static—point detonation devices.
Where arguments for an expressed existential
threat to the human species could be made and should
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be openly debated, however, is in regard to any form
of weapons system that draws upon a C2 component
that exhibits a higher-level AI capacity. This is a markedly different concern than present arms control and
human rights focused efforts attempting to ban basic
autonomous weapons systems. Expressing such concerns about sentient AI may appear ludicrous and
seem like a transition into the realm of science fiction
based on the Terminator effect— derived from the
well-known movie franchise. Then again, it might
also be highly prudent and proactive to do so.153 It has
been repeatedly said that the emergence of sentient
machines—those that not only think but also express
self-awareness—are not a real-world concern because
such a development will never take place.154 Submarines, flying machines, nuclear weapons, computers,
and spacecraft once only existed in the minds of visionaries—the Charles Babbages, Jules Vernes, and H. G.
Wells of the world. While science fictional, Asimov’s
Three Laws of Robotics should be mentioned. These
laws were created, not out of some misguided form
of pacifism, but out of a deeper underlying wisdom
meant to protect humanity:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey orders given it by human beings
except where such orders would conflict with the First
Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Law.155
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We have no idea if sentient machines will ever
emerge. However, if this occurrence ever begins to
look like the case, under no circumstances should
humans field them as autonomous weapons systems.
This would be tantamount to arming machine janissaries that may one day find more commonality with
opposing sentient autonomous weapons systems than
with their respective human masters. Of course, the
strategic dilemma is the perception that some sort of
opposing or enemy AI arms race has begun and that,
to compete on later 21st-century battlefields, armed
American AI systems will be required to contend with
Chinese, Russian, or other related systems. The development and implementation of such an arms control
regime directed at potentially sentient military AI systems would then become an imperative.156
RECOMMENDATIONS
Derived from the historical weapons systems life
cycle case studies, new strategic realities identified,
and analysis provided in this manuscript, a number
of initial recommendations have been generated for
U.S. Army and Joint force personnel pertaining to the
emergence of armed robotic systems on the battlefield.
These recommendations are not meant to be authoritative, but given the present experimental nature of
armed robotic systems, as their initial prototypes and
fielding are being worked out, to be simply taken as
educated guidance. These recommendations are as
follows.157

70

Leadership Education
Numerous ethical and leadership implications
exist relating to the fielding of armed robotic systems
and the C2 approaches utilized. For starters, answers
to team-building questions related to mixing robotic
and human troops together will be required. Issues
related to human troops deferring to robotic soldiers
for point positions in a patrol or making initial entry
for urban room clearing purposes may create leadership dilemmas with troops possibly refusing to follow
orders unless robotic systems are assigned the highrisk tasks. Human troops may overly expose themselves to unnecessary dangers to save a beloved robotic
comrade from destruction. Furthermore, ethical questions related to how robotic troops will be controlled
should be considered. The U.S. Army will need to
determine if human controllers should be embedded
within a squad, platoon, or in a special weapons company, and whether in proximity or situated far away
from a robotic system.158 Quite possibly, semi-autonomous or even autonomous robotic self-control systems
may also be deployed. Additionally, the inclusion of
human override codes—essentially, fail safe or kill
code protocols—will need to be considered. In addition to reviewing the ethics of remote killing, and how
battlefield rules of engagement will be followed, legal
issues, such as manufacturer liability for robotic malfunction, or even issues related to potential war crimes
will need to be addressed. Such issues are already
arising domestically with self-driving cars—if such a
car runs a red light and kills a pedestrian in a crosswalk, who will assume liability or be charged with the
crime?159
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Strategy Development
The influence of armed robots—integrated into
both human personnel-based military formations
and as standalone units—upon the American deployment of ground forces needs to be analyzed. Just as
unmanned drone strikes have allowed for the increasing deployment of U.S. precision strike aerial forces
in many regions of the globe, the possibility exists
that robotic-only droid units could be more readily deployed than human formations. This would be
due to the lowering of political risks associated with
mission failure. Furthermore, the personnel and force
structure implications of using droids over humans
needs to be considered. Presently assumed decreases
in manpower costs—especially salaries, health care,
family allotments, veterans benefits, and retirement
outlays—are expected to take place. The ability to utilize “G.I. Droids” (government issue armed robots),
rather than private military corporations or foreign
auxiliary troops, may also have benefits, since the
loyalty of those forces is only guaranteed as long as
funds exist to pay them. One of the vulnerabilities of
such deployment is their susceptibility to droid hacking, which would be their takeover and use by a hostile
entity against the United States.
Intelligence
Ongoing intelligence collection on adversary—
both state and nonstate—armed robotic systems that
are in development and have been fielded needs to be
conducted, as well as information gained pertaining
to their force structure mixes and doctrinal development. Special attention should be placed on Chinese
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and Russian capabilities, as well as those of new warmaking entities, such as the Islamic State. Partner
capabilities and force structure propensities must also
be tracked, as well as U.S. program information shared
with treaty partners such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and other extremely close allied states. Further,
robotics, computers, and other high tech industry and
research center partnerships must be strengthened—
especially those related to AI, neural networking, and
fuel cell advances—in order to better understand and
project the evolution of the technologies underlying
the fielding of armed robotic systems.
Research and Wargaming
Current DoD programs—both offensive (related
to systems R&D and initial fielding) and defensive
(related to force protection and countermeasures)—
concerning elements of armed robotic systems
emergence need to be identified, coordinated, and
prioritized. For instance, it must be recognized that
ongoing Army Red Team activities related to counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) field exercises
represent but one piece of a much larger program
mosaic that is forming related to armed robotic systems. While many programs will remain intra-agency
focused, given individual service mission priorities, a
high level DoD interagency research and wargaming
entity will be required to coordinate the initial Joint
force efforts. Comparisons to the Manhattan Project or
later U.S. Nuclear Navy level type initiatives may initially appear out of place, but armed robotic systems
may very well be significant enough to warrant largescale program development potentials.
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Conclusions
Additionally, the previous recommendations need
to be viewed from immediate, near, and long-term
warfighting horizons. Major iterated components
related to the emergence of these systems will be:
a. To what extent, and how quickly, should they
be integrated into our present armed services
force structures;
b. If one or more armed service or armed service
component (such as a developmental brigade,
squadron, or fleet) should be designated as the
experimental force; and,
c. What should be the appropriate mixture of teleoperated, semi-autonomous, and autonomous
robotic weapons systems in the armed services
or armed service components? The importance
and relative balance between these force structure components will, of course, change over
time as we progress through the robotic experimental weapons systems life cycle phase and, at
some point, enter the institutionalized one.
In summation, the strategic implications of the
robotics revolution cannot be overstated. The robots
are not only coming—they are here—and for future
U.S. national security requirements, we will need to
have military mastery over them. Hence, our present
and future decisions related to armed robotic systems emergence on the battlefield—and the C2 methodologies directing them—will result in near-term
and future force structure end states that will have
a fundamental impact on the U.S. conduct of war in
the coming decades, and will be a major determinant
concerning our ability to retain our dominance as the
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primary global military power well into the mid-21st
century.
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